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Like the heroine in a Saturday matinee, the derivative suit has re-
peatedly appeared to be at the cliffs of disaster. The adoption of secur-
ity for expense statutes,1 the enactment of broadly permissive
indemnification statutes,2 and even the judicial tightening of pleading
requirements against derivative suit defendants 3 have each been pro-
claimed in turn as the death knell of the derivative suit. Despite con-
cern that these developments would raise to impossible heights the
hurdles the plaintiff must cross to reach the jury, the derivative suit has
remained a viable legal institution.4 Now, however, it is threatened by
* Professor of Law, Duke University. Comments by Professor Deborah A. DeMott to an
earlier draft of the manuscript were most helpful in preparing this article. The author also
benefited from the research assistance of Messrs. Timothy J. Pakenham, James C. Reilly, and
Jeffrey D. Sternklar, members of the current graduating class.
I. See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4-7
(1947); Hornstein, The Future of Corporate Control, 63 HARV. L. REv. 476, 476 (1950); Note,
Security/or Expenses Legislation-Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 268-
69 (1952).
2. See, e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnyfcation of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
3. See, e.g., Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74 (1967).
4. The aggregate data reflects a modest increase during the 1970s in both the number of
shareholder suits and the incidence of disputed events. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of
the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Clars Action Lawsuits, 1971-1973, 60 B.U.L. REv. 306
(1980). However, when suits involving questionable corporate payments are eliminated from the
data base because they appear to have been an isolated phenomenon, "the incidence of share-
holder suits may actually be declining." Id at 323. The decline, however, is as likely a function
of burgeoning litigation costs, which have a disproportionate impact on contingency fee litigation,
as it is a result of the procedural obstacles to suit. When litigation is costly, and the outcome is
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a new and uniquely powerful assailant, the product of a creative mix of
doctrine and enabling statute, that gives the corporation an independ-
ent will and a voice to express that will in a derivative suit involving a
majority of its directors. This latest threat to the derivative suit is the
special litigation committee, an evolutignary response to earlier, rela-
tively inefficient and ineffective procedhral devices designed to termi-
nate derivative suits.
This article analyzes both the current law governing special litiga-
tion committees and proposals to change the law. As a starting point, it
assumes that the corporation has a legitimate interest in raising at any
stage in the litigation its concern that a derivative suit does it more
harm than good. A derivative suit against managers or directors may
ultimately lead to charges against the corporation for the defendant's
litigation costs, 5 the corporation's own litigation costs incident to its
participation as a nominal defendant, and the more indefinite costs as-
sociated with any litigation, such as loss of morale, deflection of em-
ployee time, and injury to the corporate reputation. Even if the
defendant's fault is conceded, the recoverable amount after deduction
of the attorney's fees of the plaintiff may be insufficient to cover the
costs of the suit; if the complaint is less well-founded, the cost-benefit
ratio is even higher.
The derivative suit plaintiff is self-selected; without election or ap-
pointment he presents himself as spokesman for the corporate interest.
Because the plaintiff usually has no significant financial interest in the
corporation, the possibly harmful economic effects of prosecuting the
suit cannot be expected to guide his decision to litigate.6 Although
uncertain, potential plaintiffs generally require a higher probability of winning before they will
initiate a suit. An increase in risk aversion among potential plaintiffs or an increase in litigation
costs results in a reduction in the incidence of litigation. See Simon, Impverfect Information, Costly
Litigation, and Product Quality, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 171 (1981).
5. If the defendants prevail, the corporation will certainly have to bear these costs.
6. Of course, the impact of a derivative suit, like that of any representative action, is not
limited to its effect on the initiating plaintiff; the whole plaintiff class has an interest in the out-
come. Derivative suits are distinguishable from class actions because stockholders are inextrica-
bly attached, through their stock ownership, to the costs and benefits of the suit. In a class action,
class members may protect themselves from the detrimental effects of a misguided or wasteful
prosecution by opting out of the plaintiff class. In a derivative suit, however, stockholders can
escape class membership only by terminating their interests in the corporation, and this may be
too high a price to pay.
There was once a requirement that the plaintiff seek stockholder approval before he initiated
the suit, see, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881), but this requirement is now re-
garded as inefficient and inexpedient. See, e.g., Interstate Refineries, Inc. v. Barry, 7 F.2d 548,
551-52 (8th Cir. 1925); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 533, 536-37, 134 A.2d 565, 567
(1957); Tevis v. Hammersmith, 31 Ind. App. 281, 66 N.E. 79, 82, aftd, 161 Ind. 74, 67 N.E. 672
(1903); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99,
114, 93 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1950); see also Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 282, 487 P.2d 545, 547-48
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some faint aura of legitimacy accrues to the plaintiffs authority to rep-
resent the corporate interest when the demand requirement has been
excused, 7 that aura is no substitute for the unique capability of the
board of directors to analyze the costs and benefits of the suit from the
corporate perspective.8 The special litigation committee remedies the
problem by providing a voice for the corporation even after the court
has excused the demand requirement. 9
(1971); Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737 (1929); Claman v. Robert-
son, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
7. The demand requirement conditions the initiation of a derivative suit on the plaintiff's
notifying the board of directors of his complaint; this notice gives the board the opportunity to
assume control of the decision to litigate. Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir.
1975). Directors are highly unlikely to respond favorably to a demand for suit, especially when
their colleagues may be named as defendants. If an independent board decides in good faith
against litigation (rejects the demand), the suit is almost always dismissed, see, e.g., Cramer v.
GTE, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1966), although
the plaintiff may be granted leave to amend his complaint, see Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F.
Supp. 120, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aj'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982). Only in rare cases will courts
allow the plaintiffto proceed after a rejected demand. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288
(1936); Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1980); Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1974); Ash v. IBM, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Higgins v.
Shenago Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958), cer. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960); Swanson v.
Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957). Therefore, most derivative suits that survive the demand
requirement are suits in which the court excuses the requirement because the plaintiff pleads facts
that implicate a majority of the board in the alleged misconduct. See, e.g., Nussbacher v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928
(1976); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1974). See generally Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Aciions, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 168 (1976). The futility of expecting the corporation to conduct the
suit under such circumstances legitimizes by default the plaintiffs authority to act in its stead.
8. See Joy v. North, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,860 at 94,440 (2d Cir. 1982)
(recognizing the value of the directors' perspective on the suit's legitimacy). A few courts have
indicated in dicta that the plaintiff has to make a greater showing of director involvement to
excuse the demand than to persuade the court to ignore the decision of the directors not to main-
tain the suit. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 54 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567
F.2d 1157, 1162 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1977). It may seem futile to require a demand when the court will not
heed the board's decision not to litigate. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982). On the other hand, the demand requirement in such cases is
no burden to the plaintiff, and it affords the directors an opportunity to express the corporate voice
and to take control of the litigation should they decide that the suit would be beneficial.
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976), best
illustrates this attitude toward the demand requirement. Section 36(b) requires a court to give
only such weight as it believes reasonable to director approval of the suspect transaction, id, and
section 1 l(a) requires that 40% of the directors be independent before the board is empowered to
reject a demand, id § 80(a)-10(a). Nevertheless, courts applying section 36(b) have required that
a demand be made even if the court is likely to find board approval unreasonable or if the board
does not satisfy the independence requirement. See infra note 103 (cases cited).
9. A special litigation committee may be created before or after a derivative suit has been
filed. The full board creates the committee and staffs it with directors who are not implicated in
the derivative suit. This is consistent with the broadly permissive scope of contemporary corpo-
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Commentators have explained in detail why the special litigation
committee's independence may be more apparent than real.10 Their
concern is founded on the observation that the defendants and the
members of the special litigation committee share a common cultural
bond: directorship of a public corporation.II The natural empathy and
collegiality that this bond engenders makes an adverse judgment of a
colleague's behavior distasteful at best. Also, when the committee is
formed after the instigation of the derivative suit, the situation is rife
with opportunities for the defendants to select for committee member-
ship those directors most sympathetic to their position. The commit-
tee's independence may be further undermined by its members' desire
to curry favor with their fellow directors or with the business commu-
nity in general. Finally, special litigation committees operate under the
constant threat of dissolution should they displease the board by pursu-
ing the plaintiff's cause with excessive zeal.
The likelihood that these factors will corrupt the committee's in-
dependent judgment will be referred to as "structural bias."' 2
rate statutes governing corporate executive committees. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 Oest
Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(c) (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (West 1974); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See generally Aurell, The Corporate Executive
Committee: 4 Dilemma/or the Nonmember Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1965); McMullen,
Committees oftheBoardofDirectors, 29 Bus. LAw. 755 (1974); Comment, Exwcutive Committees-
Creation, Procedures andAuthori y, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42.
The committee must determine whether prosecution of a derivative suit is in the corporation's
best interest. It is empowered to take any steps reasonably necessary to implement its decision,
and usually instructs corporate counsel to prosecute the suit or to move for its dismissal. Vital to
the committee's efficacy is its power, frequently recognized in the corporate statutes, to cloak its
actions with the protection of the business judgment rule even when the board as a whole is
prevented by allegations of self-interest from evoking the rule. See, e.g., Ash v. Brunswick Corp.,
405 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del. 1975); Forman v. Chesler, 39 Del. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (1961); Beard v.
Elster, 39 Del. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (1960); Stemerman v. Ackerman, 40 Del. Ch. 431, 184 A.2d 28
(1962); Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., 30 Misc. 2d 429, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1961). For a
discussion of the potential liability of disinterested executive committees, see Hahn and Manzoni,
The Monitoring Committee and Outside Directors'Evolving Duty of Care, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 587
(1978).
10. See, e.g., Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward4 Theoretical View f Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977); Dent, The Power of
Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death ofthe Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.L. REV.
96 (1980); Comment, A Procedural Treatment of Derivative Dismissal by Minority Directors, 69
CAL. L. REV. 885 (1981); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors,
65 CORNELL L. REV. 600 (1980).
11. The Delaware Supreme Court recently described this type of empathy between fellow
directors as a "'there but for the grace of God, go I'" attitude. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
12. Outside counsel advising the special litigation committee may also be under the influence
of these same corrupting pressures; corporate counsel are socialized to the defendant's point of
view through years of representing corporations and their directors and officers. Members of the
plaintiffs' bar are never chosen as counsel to the special litigation committee.
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Whatever one's view about the impact of the factors that feed a com-
mittee's structural bias, the committee's record is itself disquieting: al-
though there have been more than a score of special litigation
committee cases to date,13 in all but one the committee concluded that
the suit in question was not in the corporation's best interest.'
4
Part I of this article describes the evolution of the special litigation
committee as a result of the ineffectiveness of other procedural devices
designed to enable corporations to rid themselves of unwanted deriva-
tive suits.15 Parts II and III critically examine various standards for
13. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1006
(1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v.
GTE, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311
(S.D. Iowa 1981); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aY'd, 672 F.2d 1025
(2d Cir. 1982); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 671 F.2d 729
(2d Cir. 1982); Rosengarten v. ITT Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (motion to
dismiss denied without prejudice to renew and discovery ordered), 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (summary judgment granted),rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978),rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979);
Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.
1980), rev'dsub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Swenson v. Thibaut,
39 N.C. App. 771 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12,
col.6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Auerbach v. Aldrich, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S 2d 920 (1979); Parkoff
v. GTE, 74 A.D.2d 762, 425 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1978), ar?'d, 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442
N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981); Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979); Wesheler v. Exxon
Corp., 55 A.D.2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1977); Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Dorchester Enters., 593
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
14. The lone blemish on the special litigation committee's otherwise spotless record of siding
with the defendant is Abramowitz v. Joy, North, No. B-77-385 (D. Conn. July 16, 1980); see also
The Future of Stockholder Litigation in State and Federal Courts After Burks, Maldonado and
Abramowitz, 6 DEL. J. OF CORP. LAW 556, 557 (1981).
15. The advent of the special litigation committee is also part of a more sweeping movement
toward depending on independent directors to monitor managers. According to the monitoring
model, courts give special litigation committees preferred treatment in order to emphasize to the
independent directors the responsibilities of their undertaking. Coffee, supra note 10, at 1237-41.
The monitoring model is premised largely on beliefs of what the board can do, rather than on
observations of what boards in fact do. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in
the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975); Ei-
senberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking,
57 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1969). Even those who question the monitoring model assume its desirability
and restrict their criticisms to the mechanics of monitoring. See, e.g., Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heaveny City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); Werner, Corporation
Law in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1611, 1663-66 (1981).
The directors' general ability to monitor management may suffer because the outside direc-
tors lack the time, the information, and the expertise to make meaningful performance evalua-
tions, receive limited incentives to perform an adequate job, are not subject to significant sanctions
for a lackluster performance, and enjoy cultural and economic relationships with management
that preclude an adversarial review. See Brudney, supra, at 616; DeMott, Reweaving the Corporate
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judicial review of special litigation committee decisions. They demon-
strate that the Delaware Supreme Court's newfound sensitivity to the
effects of structural bias on the special litigation committee is more arti-
ficial than real and that the recent proposal before the American Law
Institute (the "ALI") is predicated on a wholesale misconception of the
issue. The article concludes with a suggestion for redefining the way in
which the parties and the courts evaluate the corporation's interest in
the continuation of a derivative suit.
I. THE SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
MEANS OF TERMINATING DERIVATIVE SUITS
An entire set of derivative suit procedures, including the demand
requirement, are anchored in the belief that corporations need to be
able to rid themselves of actions that are likely to do them more harm
than good. The corporation or the defendants may thwart the suit soon
after its inception by a request that the plaintiff post security for ex-
penses or by a pretrial motion for summary judgment or dismissal. Al-
ternatively, the corporation may bypass the plaintiff and reach an out-
of-court settlement with the defendant.
These procedures are used infrequently, however, because they
each have significant drawbacks that either erode their effectiveness or
render them unacceptable to the board of directors. The weaknesses of
these procedures created the impetus for the development of special
litigation committees as a new means of protecting the corporation
from unwanted derivative suits. The committee is a lineal descendant
of these maladapted ancestors and draws on them as a source of legiti-
macy as it remedies their inefficiencies.
Vei" Management Structure and the Control of Corporate Information, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 182 (1977).
These criticisms are less serious in the context of the special litigation committee. The record
to date suggests that the committee has not suffered from any lack of information. Whether the
information it receives has been sanitized by management can be determined when the court, with
the plaintiff's assistance, reviews the committee's work. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying
text. Because the committee relies heavily on counsel as fact gatherer and report drafter, it has
sufficient time and expertise to thoroughly investigate the alleged improprieties. See, e.g., Rosen-
garten v. ITT Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Finally, the rewards and sanctions for the
committee's work are embodied in the court's response to the recommendation. These circum-
stances suggest that the special litigation committee may be uniquely capable of fulfilling its moni-
toring function. On the other hand, members of special litigation committees are as likely as other
directors to empathize with management and to fall under the sway of structural bias.
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A. Securityfor Expense Statutes.
The legislative history indicates that New York's security for ex-
pense statute, the forerunner of statutes enacted in other states, was a
response to the popular conception of the derivative suit plaintiff as one
who traffics in corporate causes of action and initiates suits for the sole
purpose of harassment or personal gain.16 The goal of the security for
expense statute is to discourage the prosecution of unmeritorious
claims against management. Within a decade of its enactment, how-
ever, the New York statute proved ineffective.' 7 Such statutes are ren-
dered impotent by the common exemption' 8 for suits brought by a
plaintiff or plaintiffs who own five percent or more of the corporation's
outstanding stock or who own stock with a market value above $50,000.
If the original plaintiff does not meet these criteria, he may obtain a
stay after the motion for security is made, during which time he may
procure a list of stockholders and solicit their participation as plaintiffs
in order to satisfy the ownership requirement. Board members may
prefer not to invoke the statute at all rather than risk the adverse pub-
licity that the plaintiff's solicitation would cause. 19
Even if the board successfully invokes the statute and the court
dismisses the suit for failure to post security, the dismissal is not an
adverse judgment on the merits; the plaintiff may therefore initiate the
suit in another state that does not have a security for expense statute.
Finally, security for expense statutes do not apply to the increasing
number of derivative suits predicated on the federal securities laws.
For these reasons, state security for expense statutes offer inadequate, if
not wholly illusory, protection from unwanted derivative suits.20 By
contrast, a special litigation committee may be used in any derivative
suit to procure a final judgment for the defendants and to avoid the
adverse publicity that may surround a -plaintiff's solicitation of share-
holder support for his cause.
16. For a concise summary of the legislative history, see Comment, Securiy for Expenses in
Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 50, 50-53
(1968).
17. See Note, Security for Expenses Legislation-Summary, Analysi, and Critique, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 267, 281 (1952).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoPn. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963).
19. Comment, supra note 16, at 64-65.
20. The recent amendment of the Model Business Corporation Act to delete its security for
expense provision indicates that such provisions are ineffective. Report of Committee on Corporate
Laws, ProposedRevisions of the Model Business CorporationAct AffectingActions by Shareholders,
37 Bus. LAW. 261, 265-66 (1981).
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B. Pretrial Motions.
Some argue that the appropriate vehicle for the termination of an
unwanted derivative suit is a motion for summary judgment or a mo-
tion to dismiss.21 These motions, however, are of limited benefit to the
corporation. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court simply tests
the sufficiency of the complaint, and a court only grants a motion for
summary judgment if there are no disputed issues of material fact.
22
The motions are particularly ineffective in state law actions for breach
of fiduciary duty because it is easy to find factual disputes that have a
material bearing on the outcome of such cases.2 3 The motions are
somewhat more effective in suits under the federal securities laws be-
cause many of these suits are decided on purely legal issues, such as
whether a private right of action exists or whether the requisite causal-
ity is present.24
To make a pretrial motion, the corporation must have standing to
enter an active defense on the merits, 25 but it is unclear under what
circumstances the requisite standing exists. The corporation may de-
21. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 325 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE].
22. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.08 at 2274 (2d ed. 1982).
23. For a discussion of the weaknesses of state law summary judgment procedures, see Zack,
Cal fornia Summary Judgment: The Needfor Legislative Reform, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 453-64
(1971).
24. In attacks on questionable payment practices, derivative suit plaintiffs frequently attempt
to rely on a disclosure violation of sections 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78 n(a) (1976). Section 13(a) requires periodic reporting by certain public cor-
porations, and section 14(a) regulates the solicitation of proxies. See Abbey v. Control Data
Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F.
Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The courts in Abbey and Rosengarlen reviewed the substantive merits
of the claims and dismissed the cases at the recommendation of special litigation committees, but
the courts could have easily dismissed the cases under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted. Courts have refused to allow an implied cause of action under
section 13(a), see, e.g., In re Penn Central Sec. Litig., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974); McLaughlin v.
Campbell, 410 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Mass. 1976); duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973); f.
Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (dicta), and plaintiffs are often
unable to show a causal relationship between proxy solicitation and the failure to disclose ques-
tionable payments, see, e.g., Herman v. Beretta, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Limmer v. GTE, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,111 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But Sf Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980) (dismissal reversed to allow plaintiff to discover whether
directors concealed bribery and received kickbacks). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant directors in a suit under section 14(a).
See Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1006 (1982). The
Gaines court held that although director misconduct involving a breach of trust or self-dealing
must be disclosed in proxy materials that solicit the director's reelection, the statute does not
require disclosure of simple breach of fiduciary duty or waste. 645 F.2d at 779.
25. See infra note 78.
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fend on the merits when the plaintiff attacks an established method of
doing business, 26 but not if the plaintiff charges self-dealing or wasteful
compensation.27 The corporation cannot rely on the real defendants to
make the desired motion because the defendants may prefer to follow
their own litigation strategy, especially when it is not clear that the cor-
poration will ultimately reimiburse their expenses. 28 These hurdles are
neatly avoided when a special litigation committee recommends
dismissal.
Furthermore, using a special litigation committee allows the cor-
poration to raise a broader array of issues in opposition to the deriva-
tive suit than either the corporation or the real defendants can raise in
the context of a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
For example, if the defendants are charged with self-dealing, the case is
likely to turn on questions of disclosure, independent approval of the
transaction, the transaction's financial terms, and perhaps whether it
advances the corporate interest. A special litigation committee's rec-
26. See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944), at'd, 155
F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946).
27. See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(c) (1974);
N.Y. Bus. COpp. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5(c) (1979).
28. The defendants may be reimbursed as a matter of right only if they are successful. See,
e.g., CAL. CoPP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. COPP. LAW § 724(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1963); MODEL BUSINESS COPP. AcT § 5(c) (1979). Nevertheless, statutes often permit
indemnification if there is a successful defense "or otherwise." See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
§ 145(c) (1975); see also Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974) (construing section 145(c) to provide indemnification after any disposition short of a
criminal conviction). Under contemporary, permissive indemnification statutes, a corporation
may also reimburse unsuccessful derivative suit defendants if it has a special bylaw that permits
indemnification of fiduciaries. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(f) (1975). Many statutes
also allow the corporation to reimburse the defendants under an insurance policy. See, e.g., CAL.
COPP. CODE § 317(i) (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145(g) (1975); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 5(g) (1971).
These statutes do little, however, to alleviate the initial uncertainty as to who will bear the
cost of the defendants' litigation expenses. Indemnification as a matter of right may depend on
the outcome of the litigation, which may be highly uncertain, especially at the pretrial motion
stage. Even if the bylaws authorize indemnification of unsuccessful defendants, payment may be
contingent on a finding that they were acting in the corporate interest, see, e.g., Weisner v. Air
Express Int'l. Corp., 583 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1978), and the probability of such a finding is often
uncertain at the outset of a trial. Furthermore, courts have struck down bylaw indemnification
provisions enacted by the defendants for their own protection, see Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949
(9th Cir. 1963); Essential Enters. Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962),
although disinterested shareholder approval may remove the taint of self-interest, see Money v.
Willys-Overland Motors, 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953); Koster v. Warren, 176 F. Supp. 459 (N.D.
Cal. 1959), afjd, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202,
38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942), aftdmen., 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944); cf. Lewis
v. Anderson, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,455 at 92,682 (C.D. Cal.
1981) (stockholder ratification of defendant-directors' conduct justifies deference to special litiga-
tion committee recommendation that suit be terminated).
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ommendation would address all these issues and would also discuss an
array of additional considerations not wholly germane to the suit's
merits. The bases for the committee's recommendation customarily in-
clude an evaluation of the suit's expected net gain or loss to the corpo-
ration, which takes into account any diversion of employee time,
sapping of employee morale, unfavorable impact on the firm's reputa-
tion, and remedial steps taken since the commencement of the suit.
Because the corporation is the presumed beneficiary of a deriva-
tive suit, the court's decision whether to terminate or to continue the
suit should take into account the suit's total impact on the corpora-
tion.29 In making this assessment, the court ought to consider the direc-
tors' opinion of the suit's impact. Although the demand requirement
allows the board to weigh the net benefit of the suit to the corporation
and to make its litigation decision accordingly, the court sometimes ex-
cuses the demand requirement.30 In such cases, pretrial motions are a
poor substitute for the review of the suit's merits that a board under-
takes in response to a plaintiffs formal demand because pretrial mo-
tions are neither designed nor intended to present issues of fact.
Neither the motion for summary judgment nor the motion to dismiss
allows the court to consider the net economic impact of the suit's con-
tinuance. The motions also preclude any consideration of the problem-
atic factual issues that surround most derivative suit allegations
because neither motion can succeed on a bare showing that the suit is,
more likely than not, without merit. The motions permit dismissal of
the derivative action only on a clear showing that the charges are base-
less. Recourse to pretrial motions after the demand requirement has
been excused removes the board's factual input from the court's delib-
erations on whether the suit ought to proceed, and places an unwar-
ranted gag on the corporate voice. By contrast, the special litigation
committee has a procedural posture within the structure of the suit that
allows it to interject factual considerations into its recommendation.
Courts rationalize the deference they afford plaintiffs who have es-
caped the demand requirement in a curious fashion: they assume that
a plaintiff's exemption from the demand requirement establishes to
29. As the ALI reporter for the current derivative suit proposals correctly points out, how-
ever, it is an easy matter for the corporation to posit business-related losses that will supposedly
accrue to the continuance of the suit, because the corporation need not provide sufficient substan-
tive details to assure that these losses in fact exceed the expected gains. See CORpORATE GOVERN-
ANcE, supra note 21, commentary at 329.. Therefore, courts should closely scrutinize such cost-
benefit analyses.




some extent the legitimacy of his claims.31 This logic is hardly compel-
ling. The demand requirement is excused if the complaint's as yet un-
proven factual allegations implicate a majority of the board, making it
unlikely that the directors can impartially judge the suit's merits. 32 But
an acknowledgment of the implications of the plaintiff's allegations is
not a determination that those allegations are true. If the corporation
that seeks to terminate a derivative suit were limited to the use of pre-
trial motions after the court excused the demand requirement, the limi-
tations inherent in those procedural devices would bar the introduction
of important factual considerations, and the court's deference to the
plaintiff's pleadings would be tantamount to an apriori conclusion that
the suit serves the corporate interest. Through the recommendation of
the special litigation committee, however, the corporation is able to
speak on its own behalf, and, under the proper standard of review, the
court is able to give due deference to the plaintiffs allegations.
C. Out-of-Court Settlements.
Rather than press for a pretrial motion, the corporation may take a
more expeditious route to rid itself of a troublesome derivative suit and
enter into an out-of-court settlement with the defendants. The leading
case of Wolfv. Barkes33 securely established the corporation's power to
procure involuntary dismissal of derivative suits.3 4 In Woff, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that rule 23(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the predecessor to rule 23.1), which condi-
tions the dismissal or compromise of a class action on court approval
and notice to the plaintiff class, does not apply to the corporation's re-
lease of the defendant.3 5 Judge Friendly reasoned that the primary
purpose of the rule was to prevent a secret settlement in which the
plaintiff and his attorney receive a clandestine payment from the de-
31. Compare Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) with Stein v. Bailey,
531 F. Supp. 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Automatic deference to the plaintiff when the demand
requirement is excused is analogous to the automatic deference accorded the board of directors
when a demand is made and rejected. The latter is based on a misapplication of the business
judgment rule. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
32. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d at 799.
33. 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
34. The derivative suit plaintiff in Wofalleged violations of the federal proxy rules, waste of
assets, and the creation of wrongful stock option and compensation agreements by directors and
officers of Curtis Publishing Company. The court excused the demand requirement based on the
directors' alleged misconduct. Two of the defendants initiated actions against the corporation for
its refusal to honor stock options that were part of their employment contracts, 348 F.2d at 995 n.1,
and this may have provoked the corporation's subsequent attempt to reach an out-of-court settle-
ment with four of the defendants.
35. Id at 997:
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fendant and the corporation receives nothing; therefore, when the cor-
poration initiates the settlement, the rule does not apply. In Judge
Friendly's opinion, when the corporation undertakes a settlement, any
abuse is likely to be visible to the plaintiff shareholder, who may later
charge the engineers of an improper settlement with fraud or waste of
assets.3 6 Judge Friendly premised his analysis in Wo/f on the firm be-
lief that the corporation should have control of the corporate cause of
action, even if it is brought as a derivative suit.3 7
Nevertheless, the court in Wolf recognized that the corporation's
decision to terminate a derivative action against its officers and direc-
tors by releasing them from liability is subject to a substantial risk of
structural bias: "some suspicion may attach to a settlement made by a
board of directors that has shown no inclination to collect corporate
claims until its hand is forced by the start of a derivative suit.' '38 The
court also left open the possibility that a corporation could be enjoined
from entering into a settlement if the defendant continued to dominate
the corporation during the settlement negotiations and the plaintiff
could show that there were improper dealings.3 9
D. The Next Step-Special Litigation Committees.
The special litigation committee is the natural progeny of the type
of out-of-court settlement exemplified in Wolf. Dismissal on the rec-
ommendation of a special litigation committee and dismissal as a result
of an out-of-court settlement both allow the corporation to terminate a
derivative suit without being subject to the plaintiff review procedures
of rule 23.1; dismissal in each instance is involuntary.40 Both proce-
dures actively involve the corporation's board in deciding whether the
defendant officers or directors ought to be sued; thus, they both entail
the risk that the directors' structural bias will corrupt their judgment.
To prevent directors implicated in the suit from securing its termina-
tion, independent directors advised by experienced outside counsel
sometimes represent the corporation in settlement negotiations, 4' and
36. Id. at 996-97.
37. See id at 997.
38. Id. at 997.
39. Id. at 998.
40. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728 n.5 (8th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 444
U.S. 1071 (1980). Compare Denicke v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 141 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944) with Birnbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409, 411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (requir-
ing court approval of settlements by a board conceded to be independent of the derivative suit
defendants).
41. See Kahn v. Kaskel, 367 F. Supp. 784, 786-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Adler v. Brooks, 375
S.W.2d 544 (rex. Civ. App. 1964).
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the same safeguards are now characteristic features of the special litiga-
tion committee. In short, the special litigation committee can be
viewed as a highly systematized means of implementing the holding of
Wolf.
There is, however, one distinction between the action of a special
litigation committee and the broad mandate to settle suits that Wolf
gives the corporation. At least thus far, special litigation committees
have not executed an out-of-court settlement with the defendants, as
Wolf implies that they might.42 The committees have confined them-
selves to instructing counsel to present the committee report to the
court and to move for dismissal. This self-restraint has potential long-
range benefits for the directors: any judicial determination that the
committee was independent and acted in good faith, and any other
matter adjudicated in the court's response to the committee's recom-
mendation, can be raised defensively in a collateral attack on the com-
mittee's actions. The engineers of an out-of-court settlement have no
similar ammunition with which to ward off a subsequent attack on
their recommendation.
Wolf precludes any argument that the special litigation committee
is an impermissible aberration in the development of derivative suit
litigation. Beyond question, Wolf legitimized the power of corpora-
tions to cause the dismissal of derivative suits over the plaintiff's pro-
tests. In fact, a review of Wolf and the few reported instances in which
corporations have availed themselves of its precedential value to secure
an out-of-court settlement43 suggests that the special litigation commit-
tee has been accorded less leeway than the corporation is granted under
Wolf. For example, Wolf can be read to imply that any challenge to an
out-of-court settlement must occur through a separate derivative suit
for fraud or waste. If this were true, the court in the initial suit would
be reduced to being an uncritical acceptor of the settlement.
Of course, this is too stringent a reading of Wolf.44 In Wolf, Judge
Friendly simply suggests that a subsequent derivative suit for fraud or
42. See 348 F.2d at 997-98.
43. Denicke, 141 F.2d at 288; Kahn, 367 F. Supp. at 786-87; Birnbaum, 17 F.R.D. at 411-12;
Adler, 375 S.W.2d at 547.
44. The sole issue before the court in Wolf was whether the proposed settlement was subject
to the notice and hearing requirements of rule 23.1; there was no allegation that the settlement was
improper in any respect. Nothing in the Wolf opinion limits the court's power to enjoin the con-
summation of an out-of-court settlement when there is evidence of impropriety; to the contrary,
Judge Friendly suggests that this would be an appropriate remedy. See 348 F.2d at 998. Power to
enjoin a settlement implies power to review a settlement, and this type of review was already in
practice when Wof was decided. See e.g., National Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Adler, 324 S.W.2d 35
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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waste is one way to challenge an out-of-court settlement. Furthermore,
this method of review is equivalent to a retrospective application of the
business judgment rule, which is the standard that most courts use in
their review of a special litigation committee's recommendation. 45
Wo/'s allocation of the burden of proof to those attacking the out-of-
court settlement46 is consistent with the business judgment rule, and for
this reason Wolf parallels numerous special litigation committee
cases.47 Settlement cases such as Wof and special litigation committee
cases are also similar in another way: a board that decides to settle a
derivative suit and a committee that recommends that a suit be termi-
nated are both susceptible to structural bias, which calls into question
their presumed propriety and independence.
48
Despite these many similarities, the special litigation committee
gives the directors' decision to terminate a derivative suit an appear-
ance of legitimacy that is impossible in an out-of-court settlement. The
very expression "out-of-court settlement" in the context of a derivative
suit against insiders is pejorative, but as members of the special litiga-
tion committee, the directors presume to give a disinterested opinion of
the suit's impact on the corporation. The court then decides whether
dismissal is warranted, and this judicial imprimatur gives the directors'
decision a more detached appearance than if they were to seal a com-
pact with the defendants in an out-of-court settlement. In order to be
significant, however, the court's approval of the special litigation com-
mittee's recommendation must be based on a meaningful i -view of the
committee's work.
II. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW: FROM
A UERBACH TO ZAPATA
The commercial considerations that justify the overwhelming def-
erence courts accord director decisions in normal commercial transac-
tions do not justify the same deference when a special litigation
committee recommends dismissal or when the full board of directors
rejects a demand for suit.49 The court's rejection of the recommenda-
tion nullifies its causal impact on the corporation, and committee mem-
45. See infra text accompanying note 51.
46. 348 F.2d 994.
47. See id at 996.
48. For nearly parallel views on their respective subjects, compare Comment, Compromise of
Derivative Clains by a Corporation Without Court Approval, 52 VA. L. REV. 342, 345-48 (1966)
with Note, Special Litigation Committees: An Unwelcome Solution to Shareholder Demands, 1981
U. ILL. L. Rav. 485.
49. Joy v. North, [Current] FED. Soc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,860 at 94,439 (2d Cir. 1982); Brud-
ney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 630-31
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bers cannot be held liable for their recommendation if it has no adverse
effects. Therefore, the court need not temper its scrutiny of the com-
mittee's recommendation in order to protect the directors from liability
for having reached an improper result. Furthermore, because the com-
mittee's recommendation that a suit be dismissed is not, strictly speak-
ing, within the directors' business expertise, the court's usual extreme
deference to board decisions in commercial transactions need not ex-
tend to the committee's recommendation. For these reasons, the court
ought to take an active role in evaluating the committee's recommenda-
tion (just as it is expected to scrutinize derivate suit settlements50) in
order to protect its procedures from abuse by unjustified recommenda-
tions of dismissal and to offset the serious threat of structural bias.
Unfortunately, most courts adhere uncritically to the business
judgment rule when they review the recommendation of a special liti-
gation committee. The quintessential expression of the doctrine of def-
erence appears in Auerbach v. Bennett,51 which holds that it is
inappropriate for a court to evaluate a committee's weighing of the le-
gal, ethical, commercial, public relations, or fiscal grounds that support
the committee's recommendation that a derivative suit be dismissed.
52
Under the business judgment rule, these considerations are exclusively
within the directors' domain. Therefore, the Auerbach court confined
its examination to the areas that have traditionally remained open to
inquiry under the business judgment rule: the directors' independence
and good faith.5 3 Although these areas of inquiry include challenges to
the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's procedures, 54 the
substantive bases for the committee's recommendation remain beyond
judicial review, shielded by the business judgment rule's mandate of
deference.
By protecting the special litigation committee, the court in
Auerbach correctly makes available to the corporation the most effec-
tive means of expressing its views on the costs and benefits of the con-
tinuance of a derivative suit. To refuse to hear the corporation's views
just because the board is implicated by the plaintiffs allegations would
be to prejudge the outcome of the case and its ultimate benefit to the
corporation. Nevertheless, Auerbach's view that director decisions are
fungible, whether the decision is a committee's recommendation that a
(1982); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 280-83 (1981).
50. See infra note 92.
51. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1979).
52. Id at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
53. Id. at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
54. See id at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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suit be dismissed or a board's decision to-raise the price of the nickel
candy bar, is incorrect. Auerbach is too subservient to the special litiga-
tion committee and extends undue deference to committee recommen-
dations. Several considerations warrant stricter judicial scrutiny when a
board responds to a demand for suit or when a special litigation com-
mittee makes its recommendation than when a board makes a tradi-
tional managerial decision.55 The current position of the Delaware
Supreme Court and the proposal now under consideration by the ALI
present alternatives to the Auerbach approach. Unfortunately, each
misdirects the focus of judicial review.
A. The Talking Horse: Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado.
The novel approach of the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado56 has caused a good deal of excitement among
commentators who advocate heightened judicial scrutiny as a restraint
on the special litigation committee. 57 Like words spoken by the talking
horse on television, however, Zapata is cause for excitement because of
its source, not its substance.
The chancery court in Zapata58 held that because the business
judgment rule is a "shield and not a sword," it can only protect direc-
55. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
56. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
57. See, eg., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 327-30; DeMott, Defending the Quiet Life.
The Role of Special Counsel in Director Terminations of Derivative Suits, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
850, 853-54 (1981); Steinberg, Maldonado in Delaware: Special Litigation Committees-An Unsafe
Haven, 9 SEc. REG. LJ. 381 (1982); Comment, Off the Bench and into the Boardroom: Judicial
Business Judgment after Zapata, 70 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1982); Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado:
Restricting the Power of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Derivative Suits, 68 VA. L.
REV. 1197 (1982); Note, Business Judgment Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative Suits by Board
Litigation Committees: An ExpandedRolefor the Courts, 35 VAND. L. REv. 235 (1982); Comment,
Directors' Business Judgment in Terminating Derivative Suits Subject to Judicial Review, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1425 (1982); cf Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative
Actions: Viva Zapata, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 28, 38-58 (1981); Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom"Revis-
ited" Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913,
935-41 (1982).
58. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
In 1975 Maldonado filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery against all ten directors of
Zapata Corporation, alleging that in 1974 the board accelerated the exercise date of certain stock
options in order to reduce the personal tax liability of many of the directors, who held the options.
The acceleration also allegedly lessened the tax deduction available to the corporation. Maldo-
nado later commenced an action under the federal securities laws against nine of the ten directors,
alleging that improper disclosures were made in connection with the acceleration. The complaint
in the federal suit was dismissed, but the circuit court reversed in part and remanded the case. See
Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afrd in part, rev'd in part & remanded,
597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). In 1979, when four of the defendant-directors were no longer on
Zapata's board, the board established a special litigation committee and appointed to the commit-
tee two directors not involved in the stock option modifications. Three months after its creation,
the committee recommended that the derivative suit was not in the corporation's best interest and
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tors' decisions from subsequent stockholder attack and cannot operate
affirmatively to validate the decision of a special litigation committee
(or of the whole board) to request dismissal of a derivative suit.5 9 The
Delaware Supreme Court reversed 60 because the Vice Chancellor's in-
flexible rule gave the plaintiff too much control over the corporation's
litigation decisions. Reviewing the broad language of the Delaware
General Corporation Law that governs the board's power and the
amount of power that the board may delegate to its committees, 61 the
court held that a properly constituted committee could have power co-
equal to that of an independent board of directors. 62
Zapata recognized that in such circumstances the court's review of
the committee's recommendation must be delicately balanced. 63 A
standard of review strongly deferential to the special litigation conimit-
tee's prerogatives could mortally wound the derivative suit. Conversely,
too stringent a standard could plague corporations with burdensome
suits. By seeking a middle course, the court demonstrated a sensitivity
to the abusive potential of structural bias rarely seen in special litiga-
tion committee cases:
Moreover, notwithstanding our conviction that Delaware law en-
trusts the corporate power to a properly authorized committee, we
must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow direc-
tors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance,
who designated them to serve both as directors and committee mem-
bers. The question naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace
of God go I" empathy might not play a role. And the further ques-
tion arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and rea-
sonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps
subconscious abuse. 4
Unfortunately, although the court held that the business judgment rule
is an inappropriate standard of review, the two-tiered analysis it offered
in its place provides only an illusory improvement.
instructed the corporation's counsel to move for dismissal of both the state and the federal suits.
The federal court granted the motion, see Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
but the state court denied it, see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the appeal from the district court's decision pending the
Delaware Supreme Court's resolution of the appeal from the Court of Chancery. See Maldonado
v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. 413 A.2d at 1256-57.
60. 430 A.2d at 779.
61. Id at 785.
62. Id at 786.
63. Id at 786-87.
64. Id. at 787.
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B. The First Level of Analysis under Zapata: Independence, Good
Faith, and Factual Support.
The Delaware court in Zapata directs the lower courts to first re-
view the committee's independence, good faith, and the bases for its
recommendation. 65 The court likens the review procedure to a motion
for summary judgment 66 because the motion is not granted if there are
genuine factual issues; however, the court also intimates that the review
may include the resolution of factual conflicts through a mini-trial.67
To facilitate the court's review of the committee's actions, Zapata re-
quires the corporation to submit a record of its investigation, including
a report of its findings and recommendations. Although Zapata directs
the court to consider the "bases" for a committee's recommendation, it
does not define the term. The committee's record of its investigation,
together with its report, may perhaps form the "bases" of the commit-
tee's decision. 68 In one paragraph, however, the court uses "bases" in-
terchangeably with "reasonable investigation. ' 69 This suggests that the
bases for a recommendation are the procedures that produced it rather
than the specific grounds and findings that support it. The Zapata
court apparently envisioned its approach as a compromise between the
automatic deference of the business judgment rule and total skepticism.
Because the court's use of the term "bases" is ambiguous, however, it is
questionable whether scrutiny of the committee's recommendation un-
der Zapata is significantly different from scrutiny under Auerbach.
1. The Burden of Proof. Zapata responds to the abusive poten-
tial of structural bias by placing on the corporation the burden of estab-
lishing the committee's independence and good faith, and the
reasonableness of its investigation. Before Zapata, courts required the
plaintiff to proye that the committee lacked good faith or indepen-
dence,70 but the lesson to be drawn from those cases is that Delaware's
reallocation of the burden of proof to the corporation is not likely to
change the end result, at least insofar as good faith and independence
are concerned.71 In all but one case,72 the committee refuted the plain-
tiffs challenge to its independence simply by showing that a majority of
65. Id. at 788-89.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 788 n.15.
68. Id. at 788.
69. Id. at 788-89.
70. See inra note 73 (cases cited).
71. The shift in the burden of proof may be significant, however, with respect to Zapata's
requirement that the committee have a reasonable basis for its recommendation, especially if this
requirement means that the committee must prove that the suit will result in a net loss to the
corporation. See infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. This shift in the burden of proof is
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the committee members were not defendants in the derivative suit.73
Although the good faith requirement is in theory sufficiently broad to
be the point of departure for a searching inquiry into the committee's
performance, to date it has failed to have any substantive impact in
special litigation committee cases. In examining the committee's per-
formance under the good faith standard, courts have been satisfied if
the investigation appears systematic and diligent; they have not consid-
ered whether the information on which the committee based its deci-
sion actually justified the result.74
also justified by efficiency considerations: the committee is in a better position than the plaintiff to
produce evidence in support of the issue in dispute.
When the net-loss issue arises in suits involving an alleged violation of criminal statutes,
however, the derivative suit plaintiff has the burden of proving that the illegal act caused a net loss
to the corporation. See Siles v. Elfred, 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1963).
72. Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978), is the only case to date in
which the court has found that the committee lacked the requisite independence. This finding is
attributable to the fact situation of the case rather than to the court's penetrating review of the
committee's performance. In the same meeting at which it established the special litigation com-
mittee, the full board, including those members who would later serve on the committee, resolved
that the derivative suit was not in the corporation's best interests. Id. at 81, 250 S.E.2d at 287.
Ironically, it was the court in Swenson, not the plaintiff, that first questioned this suspect proce-
dure. The result in Swenson is analogous to the excusal of the demand requirement when the
directors have already manifested their opposition to the suit. See, e.g., Nussbacher v. Continen-
tal Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
The court in Joy v. North, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,860 (2d Cir. 1982) could have
used the committee members' prior refusal of the plaintiff's demand as a ground to discredit the
committee's recommendation that the suit be dismissed, but it did not rely on that refusal in
denying the recommendation. Id. at 94,435 n.3.
73. See, ag., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1006
(1982); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017
(1979); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1978); Rosengarten v.
ITT Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
In Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), the
court recognized the committee's independence even though one of its three members was a
named defendant in the derivative action; that director, however, had not benefited directly from
the challenged conduct. Id. at 780. Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit's finding that the com-
mittee in Lewis was independent is unusually permissive, it is consistent with the demand require-
ment cases holding that a director named as a defendant may still be capable of giving an
unbiased opinion of the derivative suit's merits. SeeIn re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d.
257 (1st Cir. 1973); Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y.
1975).
It is arguable that the Lewis court should have distinguished the (higher) level of director
interest necessary to excuse a demand from the (lower) level of interest that justifies disregarding a
board's decision not to sue. See supra note 8. See generally DeMott, supra note 57 at 859-60.
Even if this distinction is correct, however, it may well be that the level of director interest in
Lewis was low enough to have passed even this more critical test.
74. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. ITT Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Auerbach v. Ben-
nett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. 1979).
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Because Zapata does not make the burdens of proving indepen-
dence and good faith heavier, shifting these burdens of proof to the
corporation is unlikely to result in any perceptible weakening of the
special litigation committee's prerogatives. The unusual sensitivity of
the Delaware Supreme Court to the threat of structural bias may in
time cause a significant change in the definition of director indepen-
dence. Structural bias, however, is unlikely to be detected if the defini-
tion of independence focuses solely on the director's involvement with
the defendant or with the alleged misconduct. Independence in the
sense of freedom from structural bias concerns a director's attitude, not
his more observable relationships to the defendant or to the questiona-
ble conduct. This is not to suggest that a strict definition of director
independence is unimportant; it is, however, an insufficient safeguard
against structural bias.
2. The Bases of the Committee's Recommendation. If the first
level of analysis under Zapata is to impose any significant restraint on
the prerogatives of the special litigation committee and subject the
committee to closer scrutiny, it must come from the final requirement
that there be a reasonable basis for the committee's recommendation.
Although the meaning of this requirement is not entirely clear,75 there
is ample reason to conclude that it demands something more than a
general statement of the grounds for the committee's recommendation.
Special litigation committees generally identify the grounds for
their recommendations, but only infrequently offer facts or findings to
support these grounds. The grounds for a committee's recommenda-
tion that a suit be dismissed have ranged from doubts about the suit's
merits to humanitarian concerns for the defendant and his family. 76 To
be acceptable, however, the grounds ought to support the conclusion
that the derivative suit will cost the corporation more than it will bene-
fit it.77 The court should ignore the committee's recommendation if it
relies on any other basis for dismissing the suit. This limitation on the
acceptable grounds for the committee's recommendation is intuitively
appealing. It is also analogous to the requirements imposed by the
courts in other areas of derivative suit litigation: before a corporation
75. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (committee
offered twelve grounds for its recommendation).
77. The proposal currently before the ALI places on the defendants the burden of proving
that the fiduciary's breach or unlawful act yielded a net gain to the corporation. A court is to
"disregard any such gains or offsets if it finds that their recognition would frustrate an authorita-
tively established public policy." CORPORATE GOVERNANCE supra note 21, § 7.06(b).
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may indemnify or defend the defendants, or settle the suit, it must
demonstrate that the benefits of such action would outweigh its costs.
78
If Zapata requires only that the committee establish a reasonable
basis for its recommendation and uses the phrase "reasonable basis" as
it is commonly understood in conventional applications of the business
judgment rule, Zapata does little to raise the court's standard of review.
Under the conventional reasonable basis test, directors may choose
with impunity from mutually exclusive alternative courses of action as
long as they have satisfactory factual or authoritative support for the
course they choose to take.79 The legacy of this standard is a series of
78. A leading indemnification case illustrates the significance of a cost-benefit analysis in
determining whether indemnification is appropriate. In Koster v. Warren, 176 F. Supp. 459 (N.D.
Cal. 1959), aftd, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961), a stockholder of Safeway Stores challenged the
board's indemnification of its former officers for the expenses they incurred in their defense of a
criminal antitrust action. Safeway desired to settle the action to avoid the collateral estoppel ef-
fects of an antitrust judgment. Id. at 423. The government conditioned settlement on a plea of no
contest by the corporation and all named defendants, but the individual defendants agreed to so
plead only if they would be fully indemnified for their litigation expenses. Safeway agreed, and
all parties entered a plea of nolo contendere. Id at 423. The court in the subsequent derivative
suit held indemnification appropriate under these facts because the benefit of settlement to the
corporation outweighed the cost of indemnification. Id at 423-24. The court did not undertake a
detailed review of the amount of benefit that the arrangement produced, quite likely because it
was clear that the value of avoiding the precedential effects of a government antitrust judgment
would exceed the $71,000 that the officers received for their cooperation. See also Wisener v. Air
Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1977).
A cost-benefit analysis also plays a role in determining whether a corporation may defend a
derivative suit on the merits. Under the prevalent view, the corporation may defend on the merits
if the derivative suit seeks to change the corporation's manner of doing business but does not
allege that the directors acted out of self-interest. See Otis & Co. v. Penn. R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680
(E.D. Pa. 1944), af'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946). This is equivalent to a requirement that the
directors conclude that the cost of the suit would clearly outweigh its potential benefit to the
corporation. See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 230 F.2d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 1956); Messing v. F.D.I., Inc.,
439 F. Supp. 776, 782 (D.N.J. 1977). See generally Note, Defenses in Shareholder Derivative
Suits-Who May Raise Them, 66 HARV. L. REv. 342 (1952). But see Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.
App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
Finally, many courts approve settlements of derivative suits because they are concerned that
continuation of the suit would subject the corporation to costs in excess of its expected benefits.
See, e.g., Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978); Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689,
692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); Schreiber v. Jacobs, 128 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Mich.
1955). In a few cases, courts have approved settlement even though the terms of the settlement
were of questionable value because they seriously doubted that the suits had merit. In such cases,
the cost of continuing the litigation is always excessive. For example, in Lewis v. Anderson, 81
F.R.D. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court approved a settlement in which defendants agreed to
abide by a company policy to which they were already subject, and in CannonVhTexas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the primary benefit to the corporation of settling
a derivative suit was the defendants' agreement not to seek indemnification for their litigation
costs. In both Lewis and Cannon, however, the corporation was extremely unlikely to prevail on
the merits.
79. For example, in Elfenbein v. American Financial Corp., 487 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), the court held that the directors of a parent corporation had a reasonable basis for their
exercise of warrants in a subsidiary corporation because they relied on counsel's opinion that the
exercise presented no perils under the tax laws even though two other experts disagreed. The
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cases that evidence an uncritical acceptance of the directors' choice; the
courts fail to consider the relative support for the directors' alternative
courses of action. The conventional reasonable basis standard could
dissuade a court from undertaking a comprehensive inquiry into the
special litigation committee's report and into the record produced at a
hearing to decide whether the support for the committee's recommen-
dation is compelling. Under the conventional test, the court merely
reviews the record to determine whether the recommendation is a plau-
sible interpretation of the facts and the law.
Abramowitz v. Posner8 o illustrates the use of the reasonable basis
test under the business judgment rule in cases prior to Zapata. In re-
sponse to SEC charges that they had misappropriated corporate funds,
Posner and other directors entered into a consent decree that required
them to reimburse $600,000 to the corporations under their control.
The decree also required the directors to establish independent audit
committees to determine if further legal action by each corporation was
appropriate. Subsequently, a shareholder initiated a derivative action
to recover additional funds that were not recouped through the consent
decree.
After an extensive investigation, the audit committees recom-
mended that the corporations seek reimbursement of $1,021,445 and
bring suit against the directors only if they failed to make the reim-
bursement.81 In rendering their opinion, the committees revealed a
marked bias toward the defendants:
The amount which the audit committees have recommended should
be reimbursed may not necessarily be the maximum amounts which
the companies could obtain from such officers or directors in an ac-
tion naming them as defendants where the full range of judicial pro-
cedures for the ascertaining of facts would be available, or if
presumptions arising from the absence of appropriate records were
utilized to determine the amounts due.82
court in Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908-09 (Del. Ch. 1973), held that the
decision of an acquiring corporation's directors that a merger's terms were fair was reasonably
based on a projection of the earnings of the companies as combined entities even though a projec-
tion of the individual companies' earnings suggested that the terms were unfair. See also Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1180, 1194 (N.D. I11. 1980), a i'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981) (directors armed with opinion of counsel that bidder for control
posed serious antitrust problems had reasonable basis for defensive maneuvers even though ample
evidence indicated that antitrust issues could be resolved); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148,
159, 221 A.2d 487, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (alternative financing plans all deemed reasonable, choice
among plans was a matter of director discretion).
80. 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), ajrd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 120, 123.
82. Id. at 124.
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The audit committees rationalized their generosity toward the defend-
ants by noting that the defendants had greatly benefited the corpora-
tion during their terms as directors and by acknowledging that the
corporation had enacted new policies and controls to prevent recur-
rence of the challenged practices.
8 3
When the derivative suit plaintiff in Abramowitz made his re-
quired demand on the board, the board based its rejection of the de-
mand on the audit committees' report. The district court upheld the
rejection and dismissed the case without examining the bases for the
audit committees' recommendation. The Delaware court decided
Zapata before Abramowitz reached the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit on appeal; however, because the demand requirement was
not excused in Abramowitz as it had been in Zapata, the circuit court
affirmed the district court's limited review, holding Zapata's two-level
analysis inapplicable.8 4 The court held that the business judgment rule
would apply to the board's rejection of the demand unless the plaintiff
established that the board acted without good faith or lacked
independence.
85
The facts before the audit committees inAbramowitz were not un-
equivocal; the committees might have decided that the plaintiffs com-
plaint warranted the more complete factual investigation that a formal
trial would provide or that a jury could reasonably draw damaging in-
ferences from the facts. If it had examined the case under Zapata's first
level of analysis, the court would have required a more fully developed
report of these possibilities in place of the committees' glib recognition
of the uncertainties of litigation.86 Under the conventional reasonable
basis test, however, the court will not disturb the directors' decision as
long as its factual support is not insubstantial, even if the court finds a
strong likelihood that an alternative decision was advised. If Zapata
requires this level of review, the court in Abramowitz could have
reached the same result even if it had applied Zapala because there was
a reasonable basis for the committees' recommendation. This reading
of Zapata, however, accords the committee too much freedom and
gives the court too little authority to evaluate the committee's ability to
render a detached opinion of the suit's benefits to the corporation.
8 7
83. Id. at 123.
84. 672 F.2d at 1032-33. The corporation inAbramowitz was a Delaware corporation. 513 F.
Supp. at 121.
85. 672 F.2d at 1033.
86. Id
87. Although the reasonable basis standard has been involved in several business judgment
rule cases, see supra note 79 (cases cited), courts generally have contented themselves with exam-
ining the facts for fraud, oppression, or self-dealing on the part of the directors. Bishop, supra
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3. The Impact of Zapata. The Zapata court departed from the
highly deferential stance taken in Auerbach because of its concern that
director bias may skew the committee's recommendation; but the subtle
hand of structural bias cannot be directly detected. An inquiry into the
record and factual bases that support a recommendation is in effect a
surrogate investigation of the committee's structural bias: if the facts
do not support the recommendation, it is highly likely that the commit-
tee was influenced by factors other than the corporate interest.
88
Where Auerbach precludes an inquiry into the factual bases of a com-
mittee's recommendation, Zapata's overriding concern with director
bias should require a searching inquiry into both the facts that support
the recommendation and into the net costs and benefits of the recom-
mendation to the corporation.
89
note 2, at 1099-1101. See generally Arsht, Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTPA L. REv.
93 (1979). Even in states whose corporate statutes prescribe a standard of reasonableness for
directors' conduct, courts have limited their inquiry to the questions of good faith and indepen-
dence. Compare N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 117 (McKinney Supp. 1981) with Kamin v. American
Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct. 1976). Thus, if the Delaware Supreme
Court adopted the reasonable basis standard, courts would assume a more active role than they
generally have in conventional business judgment rule cases. Nevertheless, this higher level of
review falls short of that desirable to unearth director bias.
88. See Watts v. Des Moines Register and Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981). In
Watts, a committee recommended that a cause of action be dismissed even though its special
counsel recommended litigation. The court held the matter for further consideration of the com-
mittee's reasons for departing from its counsel's advice. It remains to be seen what response a
reviewing court would make under Zapata if counsel's opinion were more equivocal. For exam-
ple, in Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), rep'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), counsel to
the special litigation committee submitted its opinion that the defendants were not liable, but
substantially qualified that opinion by noting the absence of legal authority on the issue in ques-
tion. Counsel further cautioned that it could not determine how such an untested issue would be
resolved.
89. The adversarial proceeding envisioned by Zapata, which focuses on the record developed
by the committee, has as an indispensable adjunct more expanded discovery powers for the plain-
tiff, who must challenge the committee report. Under the Auerbach doctrine, the scope of discov-
ery available to the plaintiff is limited to matters that bear closely on the committee's good faith
and independence and does not extend to an inquiry into the committee's reasoning, its decision-
making process, and the factual bases for its recommendation. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615
F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d
724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). As a result, the
plaintiff can prevail under Auerbach only if there is irrefutable evidence of committee bias. See
Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978); see also supra note 72 (discussion of
Swenson).
It must be noted, however, that the Zapata court merely observed that the necessary dis-
covery may be ordered. 430 A.2d at 788. The court then cited several cases in which discovery
was not extended to the suit's merits. Id. at 788 n.16. Three of the four cases cited limit the
plaintiff to deposing the committee's participants on their good faith and independence. See
Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F. Supp. 817, 823
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Only in Maldo-
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Under this interpretation of Zapata, the adversarial review of a
committee's recommendation should determine more than whether the
grounds for the committee's recommendation have reasonable factual
support. Courts should not be misled by the bare articulation of nu-
merous unsupported grounds for dismissal or by grounds with only
weak factual support. The proponents of the committee report should
have the burden of proving that among all possible courses of action,
those embodied in the committee's recommendation are most likely to
serve the corporate interests.90
nado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), is there dicta, but no holding, obliquely
suggesting that the plaintiff may have more extensive discovery power. In at least one case (not
cited by Zapata), the court allowed discovery on the suit's merits, but the plaintiff did not succeed
in discrediting the committee's recommendation. See Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682,
697 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
In a recent decision following Zapata, the court allowed the plaintiff to depose the commit-
tee's members on the objective factors underlying their decision, but the court limited the permis-
sible scope of the inquiry to the factors that entered into the committee's decision. See Watts v.
Des Moines Register and Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981). The court did not permit
questions concerning why the committee considered those factors and ignored others. This lim-
ited extension of the plaintiff's discovery power should enable the plaintiff to attack the reasona-
bleness of the committee's report only if the plaintiff has also had an opportunity to engage in
discovery against the corporation and the defendants on the merits of the suit. When, as in.
Zapata, the derivative suit begins several years before the special litigation committee makes its
recommendation, the plaintiff is likely to be armed with enough information about the case's
merits to seriously review the factors considered by the committee. If, however, the committee
makes its report soon after the initiation of the suit, the plaintiff's effort to discredit the committee
may be seriously crippled if discovery is confined to those matters the committee chose to include
in its inquiry.
90. There is evidence that courts can assume a less passive role by using pleadings, affidavits
and "minitrials" to determine early in the litigation whether a derivative suit is worth pursuing.
California's security for expense statute, CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c)-(e) (West 1977), for example,
requires the corporation or the defendant to prove that the suit is not reasonably likely to benefit
the corporation. See id. § 800(c); Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961); Burt v. Irvine
Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828,47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965); Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., 205 Cal. App.
2d 171, 22 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1962); Thomas v. Summers Gyroscope Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 234, 324
P.2d 893 (1958); Kaiser v. Easton, 151 Cal. App. 2d 307, 311 P.2d 108 (1957); Olson v. Basin Oil
Co. of Calif., 136 Cal. App. 2d 543, 288 P.2d 952 (1955); Wood v. Gordon, 112 Cal. App. 2d 374,
246 P.2d 84 (1952). See generally Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far is
California'r New "Securltyfor Expenses"Act Sound Regulation, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 399 (1949).
By contrast, courts often fail to subject proposed derivative suit settlements to close analysis.
See generally Note, The Need for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Approval of
Proposed Settlements of Shareholder Derivative Actions, Greenspan v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375 (1st
Cir. 1974), 36 OHIo ST. LJ. 163 (1975). In a recent case, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit offers guidance to courts exercising their own independent judgment under Zapata's sec-
ond level of analysis. See Joy v. North [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,860 (2d Cir.
1982). The court should dismiss the case if it finds "that the likely recoverable damages dis-
counted by the probability of a finding of liability are less than the [direct] cost of the corporation
in continuing the action." Id. at 94,442. According to the court, direct costs include the corpora-
tion's litigation expenses, employee time, and mandatory indemnification costs. Id. After ac-
counting for insurance, if the recovery expected exceeds direct costs, but is insubstantial in relation
to shareholder equity, the court may consider incidental costs, such as damaged employee morale
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In undertaking this review there is little to guide a court other than
its own independent judgment. Courts should be aware that there is
often an inverse relationship between the strength of a suit's merits and
the persuasiveness of other grounds that a committee may advance in
support of dismissal. As derivative suits that end in a settlement
demonstrate, courts are less willing to accept grounds for settlement
that are unrelated to the suit's merits when the suit is not frivolous.9 '
On the other hand, if a court is satisfied that factual or legal issues pose
significant obstacles to the plaintiff, it will readily approve a settlement
in which the primary benefit to the corporation is simply its avoidance
of undetermined future litigation costs and the disruption of its opera-
tions.92 These general observations are hardly legal talismans for
and lost profits caused by the suit. Id. The Joy court's distinction between direct and incidental
costs appears to recognize that the latter should play a role only in cases of questionable benefit to
the corporation because such costs are inherently incapable of satisfactory measurement.
91. Seesupra note 78. For example, in In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 543 F.2d 1058 (3d
Cir. 1976), the primary benefit of the settlement to the corporation was avoiding the aggravation,
expense, and inconvenience of the suit. See 1d. at 1073 n.6. The appellate court reversed the
district court's approval of the settlement on the grounds that the settlement was of insufficient
benefit to the corporation, id at 1069; the court demanded a specific finding that the costs avoided
by settlement outweighed the $2,100,000 that the corporation was required to pay. Id It is no
coincidence that the defendant virtually conceded liability in In re Pittsburgh. See id. at 1061-62.
The merit of the derivative suit claim warranted the appellate court's critical review of the settle-
ment's terms.
92. See supra note 78. In Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978), the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the proposed settlement of eight derivative actions of
dubious merit. The Shlensky court enumerated several benefits of settlement to the corporation,
but each was of questionable value. The settlement provided full indemnification for the defend-
ants, but the corporation's indemnification insurer agreed to pay $2,000,000 to the corporation in
return for a release from the indemnification policy. Presumably, the $2,000,000 was the estimated
cost of indemnification, but this payment benefited the corporation only because the settlement
required indemnification, which many settlements do not. The court considered the payment a
benefit because there was some question whether the insurer was legally bound to honor its con-
tract with the corporation, 574 F.2d at 148 n.1 I; however, it is unlikely that the corporation would
have agreed to the indemnity provision in the settlement if its insurer had not agreed to pay.
Similarly, the settlement allegedly benefited the corporation by its cancellation of the defendants'
stock options, valued at more than $850,000. Id. at 148. Because it is uncertain that options will
be exercised, however, some courts consider this type of gain illusory. See, e.g., Fricke v. Daylin,
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The settlement in Shlensky also included the return of
$620,000 in earned executive incentive compensation. The corporation's board had returned the
compensation two months earlier for reasons unrelated to the derivative suit, however, so the
benefit to the corporation of the settlement was actually the defendants' release of their potential
claim against the corporation for its earlier cancellation of their incentive compensation. 574 F.2d
at 146. Nevertheless, the $607,000 attorney's fee that the corporation paid under the terms of the
settlement, see id. at 150, 152, probably outweighed the benefit of the release. Finally, the Shlen-
sky court noted that settlement would avoid the cost, inconvenience, and damage to the corporate
reputation that continued litigation would entail, but the court did not value this benefit moneta-
rily. The total expected benefit of settlement to the corporation was set at $3,500,000, id at 145-46,
and the total value of the spurious benefits described above is $3,470,000. Thus the major benefit
of this settlement probably was the avoidance of continued litigation and a cost savings of $30,000.
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courts reviewing committee recommendations; nevertheless, they sug-
gest that courts should demand more extensive factual or legal support
for a recommendation of dismissal if the suit appears meritorious, and
that courts should be less critical if the suit seems frivolous.
Zapata could, and arguably should, encourage courts to undertake
a thorough review of the recommendation of a special litigation com-
mittee. Unfortunately, the first level of review in Zapata incorporates
terms and principles that can be used to undermine the impact of the
case. Although the committee must prove its good faith and indepen-
dence, the established criteria for good faith and independence are rel-
atively easy to satisfy. Similarly, the requirement that the committee
establish a reasonable basis for its recommendation is likely to be inter-
preted leniently in light of the business judgment doctrine. For these
reasons, the first level of review under Zapata is likely to be assimilated
into the existing case law, and its impact will be minimal.
C. The Second Level of Ana~lsis Under Zapata: Considerations of
Public Policy.
1. Reaching the Second Level of Ana'ysis. Under Zapata's sec-
ond level of analysis, the reviewing court exercises its independent
judgment to determine whether it should follow the recommendation
of the special litigation committee and dismiss the suit. In making its
evaluation, the court may disagree that the corporation's interest would
be best served by dismissal, or the court may decide that, despite the
corporation's interest in dismissal, considerations of public policy re-
quire that the suit continue.93 In theory, Zapata's activism is a wel-
come change from the passivity that predominates the Auerbach
approach.
There are, however, two unfortunate aspects of Zapata's second
level of analysis. First, a second level review is only available after the
court determines, under the first level of analysis, that the suit is not
frivolous.94 Thus, if the court finds that the committee had a reason-
able basis for its conclusion that the suit lacks legal merit and should
therefore be dismissed, the court cannot use its discretion to reject the
committee's recommendation under Zapata's second level. Only in
cases in which there was no reasonable basis for the committee's con-
No doubt the poor chance of success on the merits made even these terms attractive. Cf. Gaines v.
Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1006 (1982) (dismissing causes of
action similar to those in ShIensky). For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis of derivative suit
litigation, see supra note 78.




clusion that the suit is frivolous may the court go on to its second level
of review and decide whether the committee's recommendation to dis-
miss should be followed even though the suit is not frivolous.95
Many of the considerations that may prompt a committee to argue
against the continuation of the suit involve matters outside the judici-
ary's experience. For example, the corporation can calculate the im-
pact of the suit on employee expectations and morale and can answer
other questions peculiar to the firm; however, the court's ability to re-
view such issues is necessarily limited. On the other hand, courts are
experienced in exercising their independent judgment in regard to the
suit's legal merits. It would be more reasonable to allow the court to
exercise its independent judgment on all matters within its competence
than to restrict the second level of analysis to nonfrivolous suits in
which the committee's decision rests largely on factors beyond the
courts' normal experience.
2. Limitations on the Public Policy Inquiry. Equally troubling is
Zapata's invitation to courts to give "special consideration to matters
of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best inter-
est."'96 This suggests that even if dismissal is in the corporation's best
interest, that interest must give way to broader societal concerns pro-
tected by established public policy. Lasker v. Burks97 was the first case
to suggest that a committee's recommendtion may be ignored if it con-
flicts with public policy. The derivative suit plaintiff in Burks alleged
that an investment company's adviser and some of its directors had
95. Two courts purporting to follow Zapata have stated in dicta that courts may exercise
their independent judgment in reviewing a committee's recommendation; these courts did not
acknowledge that Zapata limited this phase to non-frivolous suits. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 671
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa
1981). After determining that the committees in Maldonado and Watts were independent and
acted in good faith, the courts required each committee to develop further the factual record in
support of its recommendation but did not review the committee's results. The cases therefore
shed no light on the level of judicial review that courts will undertake following Zapata.
In a recent case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted Zapata as inviting
review of the committee's independence, good faith, and reasonable investigation, but not the
bases for its decision. See Joy v. North [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,860 at 94,441 (2d
Cir. 1982). The court, although purporting to follow Zapata, held that a court must always pro-
ceed to the second level of analysis and exercize its own independent judgment. Even though the
court in Joy appears to violate the Zapata formulation of the review process, the result in Joy may
nevertheless be consistent with Zapata: Joy clearly involved a nonfrivolous derivative suit, and
the court found the factual bases that the committee presented to support its recommendation
internally inconsistent. Id. at 94,444-45. The Joy court's holding that a court must always ex-
ercise independent judgment presents a welcome change from the overly deferential role envi-
sioned in Auerbach, however, and the Joy formulation is preferable even if it is inconsistent with
Zapata.
96. 430 A.2d at 789.
97. 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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recommended purchases that violated the Investment Company Act of
1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.98 A committee of five
directors, who were neither affiliated with the investment adviser nor
named in the suit, recommended dismissal of the action. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that to dismiss the suit on the basis
of the independent directors' decision would be inconsistent with the
policy of the Investment Company Act,99 but the Supreme Court re-
versed.' 00 The Court prescribed a two-stage analysis of the directors'
decision to terminate derivative suits brought under federal statutes.
The threshold inquiry is to determine whether the directors have the
power under state law to terminate the derivative action. If they do,
the court must then determine whether dismissal of the suit would be
inconsistent with the policy embodied in the federal cause of action.' 0'
The Court's second level of analysis in Burks had a very narrow
focus. The Court examined the structure and purpose of the Invest-
ment Company Act' 02 and its legislative history. Congress had rejected
an amendment to the Act that would prevent directors from terminat-
ing derivative suits; the Congress chose instead to address an array of
conflict of interest problems through the Act's requirement that forty
percent of the board of directors be disinterested and through specific
requirements directed toward self-dealing transactions. 10 3 To illustrate
circumstances in which a committee's decision to terminate a derivative
suit would seriously conflict with federal law, the Burks Court referred
to section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act'04 and section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act.'0 5 In these statutes, Congress tailored the
98. Id at 1210-11.
99. Id at 1210.
100. 441 U.S. at 471.
101. Id at 480.
102. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a et. seq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
103. 441 U.S. at 482-85. As the Burks Court also observed, id at 484, in 1970 Congress
amended section 36 to add section 36(b). Subsection (2) of that section implores courts to give
only such weight as they believe appropriate to board decisions that approve compensation. See
Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1429 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976)). Post-
Burks cases, however, have not viewed subsection (2) as excusing the demand requirement. See
Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982); Markowitz v. Brody, [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,002 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Pre-Burks cases reached the same result. See
Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 79 F.R.D. 36, 44-46 (D. Mass.), vacated on other
grounds, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978); Boyco v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that Congress did not intend the
action to recover excessive management fees under section 36(b) to be a corporate action for
which a demand on the directors is required. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 98,845 (2d Cir. 1982).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
105. Id § 78p(b). This provision prohibits short-swing trading for a profit by insiders.
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procedural requirements for maintaining a derivative suit with great
specificity: section 36(b) directly addresses the degree of deference to
be accorded director or shareholder approval of management fee con-
tracts, 0 6 and section 16(b) specifies that a derivative action may be
maintained if a corporation refuses to sue.'0 7 The Court reasoned that
these statutes addressed directors' discretionary powers with such par-
ticularity that it would be inconsistent to infer that Congress intended
to grant directors the power to dismiss the suit. 08 The statutes both
explicitly refer to the directors' decision not to sue; in contrast, the stat-
ute at issue in Burks contained no such reference.
To illustrate the policy considerations, or more specifically the leg-
islative intent that would override a committee recommendation that a
derivative suit be dismissed, the Burks Court pointed to two private
causes of action expressly created by Congress. By contrast, the causes
of action in Burks were merely implied. Only within statutes that ex-
pressly authorize a cause of action are the procedural requirements for
suit described with sufficient particularity to warrant the inference un-
der Burks that Congress did not intend the directors to have power to
dismiss the suit. Under the implied causes of action, where the great
bulk of derivative suit litigation under the securities laws occurs, the
statute's language does not deal with the procedural issues concomitant
to private enforcement, and the legislative history is also silent on the
question.
If a court were to reject a special litigation committee's recommen-
dation in a suit under an implied cause of action, it would do so on the
basis of a general perception that it is more important to serve the pub-
lic interest through private enforcement of the federal law than it is to
serve the corporate interest by dismissal. This kind of reasoning occurs
nowhere in Burks and is an impermissible extension of the Burks doc-
trine.109 Although the court in Zapata apparently approved such a re-
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
108. 441 U.S. at 484.
109. Even assuming that it is desirable to balance corporate and societal interests, the balanc-
ing process would not necessarily limit the prerogatives of the special litigation committee. As the
court in Lewis v. Anderson noted:
Allowing disinterested directors to exercise their business judgment to dismiss what
they see as groundless causes of action would in no way weaken the regulatory provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. So long as those accused of manipulating the proxy
vote are excluded from deciding whether or not to pursue the claim there is no conflict
between the business judgment rule and § 14(a).
615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
The courts in Lewis and all other post-Burs cases have consistently upheld the committee's
recommendation even under Burks' second level of analysis after satisfying themselves that the
committee's challenge to the federal action's merits and benefits was well justified. See, e.g.,
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suit, it conflicts with accepted views of the purpose of derivative suits" 10
and would pose insurmountable problems."'
3. The Purpose of the Derivative Suit: Deterrence Versus Compen-
sation. The second level of analysis in Burks and Zapata"2 resurrects
the time-worn question whether the purpose of derivative suits is to
deter wrongdoing or solely to recompense the injured corporation. The
statement in Zapata that courts should "give special consideration to
matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best
interests"'"1 3 sounds a hopeful note for those who emphasize the deter-
rent function of derivative suits. It is no coincidence that commenta-
tors who champion Zapata's second level of analysis are those who
generally view the derivative suit as having a purpose quite apart from
Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1006 (1982); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Maldonado
v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274,281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a f'dinpart andrev'd inpart on other grounds,
671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982).
Decisions that evaluate a committee's recommendation under Burks are notable for the thor-
oughness with which the courts review the merits of the federal causes of action. There is a sharp
contrast in these opinions between the courts' careful inspection of the alleged federal violation
and their nearly complete .abdication of any review function with respect to the state law claims,
even though these claims were based on the same conduct that received careful scrutiny when it
was the basis for a federal claim. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981);
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979); Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Burks requires careful
scrutiny of the federal claim before a court even begins to consider whether the committee's rec-
ommendation offends federal policy because Burks' second level of inquiry applies only to non-
frivolous federal claims. Obviously, dismissal of a frivolous claim could not conflict with any
legislative intent or established federal policy.
The importance of the committee's independence to Burks public policy analysis cannot be
emphasized too greatly. In Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980), the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reasoned that the federal policy of full and fair disclosure in proxy solicita-
tions would be frustrated if directors implicated in an alleged violation could cause the suit to be
dismissed. Id at 63. In this way federal courts applying Burks reinforce the state law require-
ment of independence. It is not clear that the independence requirement, however satisfied,
should be that important if the court has truly satisfied itself that the suit is of doubtful merit.
Obviously, the committee's independence is reassuring in cases in which the suit is not patently
without merit. This sense of reassurance may be deceptive, however, because it is not possible for
any definition of independence to screen out directors who are prone to the subtle influences of
structural bias.
110: See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
112. There is an important difference between the second levels of analysis in Burks and in
Zapata: considerations of public policy are discretionary in Zapata and mandatory in Burks.
Furthermore, only Zapata encourages the court to include in the second level of analysis its in-
dependent evaluation of the corporation's interest in dismissal. Unless state law mandates other-
wise, the second level analysis under Lurks will not disturb the directors' conclusion that dismissal
would serve the corporate interest; the court only determines whether that unchallenged conclu-
sion must give way to a federal policy that supports the continuation of the suit.
113. 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
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compensation.114 It is still too early to tell how this debate will be re-
solved in the context of the special litigation committee cases. As dis-
cussed above, 115 decisions in the wake of Burks offer no encouragement
to those who argue that courts should give less weight to the business
purposes that support the committee's recommendation. Similarly, the
courts have yet to invoke Zapata's second level of analysis to strike
down a committee's recommendation. Because the courts have not
been presented with a committee recommendation for the dismissal of
a non-frivolous action, the full reach of either precedent remains to be
tested. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that if a committee
recommends that a non-frivolous suit be dismissed in the corporate in-
terest, and a strong public policy favors its continuation, the corporate
interest should prevail. The question whether the primary purpose of
the derivative suit is deterrence or compensation has arisen in other
areas, and in each case the goal of compensation has prevailed.
For example, suppose that the derivative suit defendant knowingly
violates a state or federal criminal statute to the corporation's benefit.
Commentators have sometimes envisioned that in such a case the de-
rivative suit can operate in tandem with a public prosecution to further
the public policies that underlie criminal statutes." 6 Language in a few
older cases equates violations of criminal statutes with breaches of
common law fiduciary duties." 7 If deterrence were the function of the
derivative suit, these precedents would continue to govern today,'18
114. See, eg., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49 at 287, 300; Schwartz, Response: Some
Thoughts on The Director's Evolving Role, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1409-10 (1979).
115. See supra note 109.
116. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 287, 300; Schwartz, supra note 114, 1409-10.
But see Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 143 (1961)
(directors and officers should be shielded from personal liability for violations of criminal statutes
that benefit the corporation).
117. See Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 55-56, 74 N.E.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. 1947); Roth v. Rob-
ertson, 64 Misc. 343, 346, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909). Although Abrams and Roth
were cited with approval in Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1974), Miller substan-
tially qualified their holdings by requiring proof of independent damages before the corporation
can recover for a knowing criminal violation. Id. at 763 n.5. Roth's language itself belies the
notion that recovery can occur without proof of injury to the corporation. In dicta, the Roth court
reasoned that the directors are liable for an unlawful act through which "they cause loss to the
corporation," 64 Misc. at 345, 118 N.Y.S. at 353, and the court refers repeatedly to the need to
impose liability to deter wasting the corporation's assets, id. at 346, 118 N.Y.S. at 353-54. Simi-
larly, a crucial paragraph in the complaint in Abrams alleged that the directors' decision to close
the plant was not motivated by a desire to further the corporation's interests, but by "malice, bias
and personal prejudices" toward the organizing efforts of its workers, 297 N.Y. at 55, 74 N.E. 2d at
306, and the plaintiff alleged that the corporation suffered a financial loss because of the plant
closing, id
118. Coffee, supra note 10, at 1166-72, recounts the weaknesses of these precedents.
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and proof of a public injury would enable the corporation to recover
regardless of the net effects of the litigation on the corporate fisc.
The prevailing rule is otherwise. The plaintiff must establish not
only that the criminal act gave rise to an economic loss to the corpora-
tion, but that the resulting loss was greater than the competitive bene-
fits garnered through the violation." 9 This "net loss" approach to the
corporation's right to recover for its fiduciary's illegal acts suggests that
when continued prosecution of a meritorious derivative suit will not
yield a net benefit to the corporation, the corporation should be able to
terminate the suit. In each instance, courts subordinate public policy to
the crass accounting question of whether dismissal or continuance pro-
duces a net gain to the corporation.' 20
To suggest that the Supreme Court's invocation of public policy
considerations in Burks invites courts to favor the deterrent aspects of
derivative suits over a determination that dismissal avoids a net loss to
the corporation would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's earlier
position in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock Rail-
road.'2' Through its wholly owned subsidiary, Bangor Punta Corpora-
tion acquired 98.3 percent of the stock of Bangor & Aroostock Railroad
(BAR) and later sold those shares to Amoskeag Company at their fair
value. Once in control of BAR, Amoskeag caused BAR to sue Bangor
Punta and its subsidiary for funds allegedly misappropriated from
BAR by the defendants during their years of control. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit refused to dismiss the action by BAR,
relying in part on the need to deter mismanagement, particularly
among quasi-public corporations such as BAR. 122
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, however, holding in-
stead that considerations of deterrence do not justify a corporate recov-
ery.'23 The Court pierced the plaintiff's corporate veil and held that a
119. Siles v. Elfred, 149 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Borden v. Cohen,
231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1962); Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947);
see also, Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Offlcersfor
Violations of Fiduciary Duties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L. REV. 313, 333-39 (1965);
Note, Pleading and Proof ofDamages in Stockholders Derivative Actions Based on Antitrust Convic-
tions, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 174 (1964).
120. The weakness of this approach is that it allows established public policy to be pushed
aside by fairly indefinite accounting inputs. Some suggest that this weakness could be remedied
by taking a compromise position in the deterrence-compensation debate and shifting the burden
of proof to those who seek to show that the suit will not result in a net gain to the corporation. See
Coffee, supra note 10, at 1220. If this is what is required to salve those uneasy with a net loss
inquiry, they will be pleased with Zapata, which accomplishes this shift in the burden of proof.
See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
121. 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
122. 482 F.2d 865, 868 (1st Cir. 1973).
123. 417 U.S. at 717.
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purchaser of shares at their admittedly fair price cannot then sue the
seller for mismanagement; if such suits were allowed, the new share-
holders would recover for wrongs done to the previous owners. The
Court viewed proof of loss as indispensable to a suit by the corporation.
Bangor Punta is the Supreme Court's acceptance of then Commis-
sioner Pound's reasoning in a classic decision, Home Fire Insurance Co.
v. Barber.'24 Pound responded to the deterrence argument advanced
by a corporation whose sole owner purchased the corporation's shares
from the defendant at an admittedly fair price:
It is not the function of courts of equity to administer punishment.
When one person has wronged another in a matter within its juris-
diction, equity will spare no effort to redress the person injured, and
will not suffer the wrongdoer to escape restitution to such person
through any device or technicality. But this is because of its desire to
right wrongs, not because of a desire to punish all wrongdoers. If a
wrongdoer deserves to be punished, it does not follow that others are
to be enriched at his expense by a court of equity. A plaintiff must
recover on the strength of his own case, not on the weakness of the
defendant's case. It is his right, not the defendant's wrongdoing, that
is the basis of recovery.1 25
It is clear that fear of unjustly enriching the owner of the plaintiff cor-
poration underlies the holdings in Barber and Bangor Punta.126 Con-
cern over unjust enrichment is not, as some have suggested, 127
separable from the question of whether the derivative suit is to serve a
compensatory or a deterrent function. If the defendant's wrong has
caused no injury to those who would benefit from a corporate recovery,
124. 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). For some interesting extensions and refinements of
Barber, see Rock River Say. & Loan v. American States Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979)
(suit against an accounting firm, not the managers from whom the plaintiff's sole stockholder
acquired its shares), and Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (derivative suit initiated by a minority stockholder against defendants who sold 90% interest
after defrauding the controlled corporation).
The Court suggested in Bangor Punta that recovery may in appropriate cases be made on a
pro-rata basis in a minority-initiated suit. 417 U.S. at 711. In In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R.
Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 387 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974), however, the court rejected this sugges-
tion out of concern for creditor protection.
125. 67 Neb. at 673, 93 N.W. at 1035.
126. Other concerns also bar recovery in Bangor Punta and similar cases, see Bangor Punta,
417 U.S. 703, 716-17 (1974); In re REA Express, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and
explain the exceptions that have been made in the doctrine, see, e.g., Mauck v. Mading-Dugan
Drug Co., 361 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116,249 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1964), afdper curiam, 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204 N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. 1965). Seegener-
ally, Note, Corporate Incapacity to Sue Where Stockholders Would be Barredfrom Suing Deriva.
tively--The Vicarious Incapacity Rule: A Public Interest Exception, 54 B.U.L. REV. 355, 389
(1974). For a view that even private actions under the securities laws must be compensatory, see
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
127. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 239 (embracing the deterrent function
of the derivative suit).
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the recovery cannot be justified on grounds of compensation because
any such recovery would, by definition, be a windfall. Avoiding unjust
enrichment and refusing to justify recovery on the grounds of deter-
rence are therefore corollary principles.
The special litigation committee cases give courts even stronger
reasons to eschew derivative suits that have solely a deterrent function.
The corporation in Bangor Punta, driven by the desire to reap a $7
million return on its $5 million purchase of BAR, sought to prosecute a
suit against a recognized, active wrongdoer. In the special litigation
committee cases that trigger Burks' and Zapata's requirement that a
court balance the net gain to the corporation against the public interest
in deterrence, however, the corporation does not want to be a party to
the action because the action will probably result in a net loss.
128 If
deterrence was an insufficient reason to allow the corporation to reap a
benefit in Bangor Punta, it is difficult to imagine how deterrence can
justify forcing a corporation to suffer a net loss in cases decided under
Burks.
To be consistent with the historical, compensatory purpose of the
derivative suit, the court should address only considerations important
to the corporation from a financial standpoint under Zapata's second
level of analysis. Other legal rules or considerations have not been suf-
ficient in the past to permit continuance of the derivative suit.
129
Therefore, the consideration of public policy called for under Burks
and Zapata should not affect the prerogatives of the special litigation
committee. Only in those rare situations foreseen in Burks in which
Congress has carefully tailored the substantive and procedural ele-
ments of an express cause of action to preclude termination of the suit
128. In order to reach the second level of analysis under Zapata, the court must first decide
that the suit is not frivolous. If the court believed the suit frivolous, it would have dismissed it
before reaching the second level of analysis. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. There-
fore, if a court rejects a committee's conclusions under Zapata's second level of analysis, it wil
risk causing the corporation a net economic loss. A committee may offer unimpeachable findings
that the corporation can expect to recover $200,000 from the suit, but that its costs, plus the value
of other losses sustained in prosecuting the action, will be $300,000. The court, in the interest of
public policy, could require that the corporation suffer a net loss of $100,000 by continuing the
suit. Ignoring the committee's justification for dismissal not only conscripts the corporation to
vindicate the public interest, it also visits on the corporation costs and losses in excess of the
expected benefits of the suit.
129. The possibility that the public interest will be vindicated by criminal or administrative
enforcement of the federal or state law may console those who are uneasy that unlawful conduct
will go undeterred or unprosecuted. See, e.g., In re REA Express, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D.
Pa. 1976). Furthermore, creditors of the injured corporation may independently obtain relief for
damage to their debtor. See Capital Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 A.D. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d
291, 292 (1950), affldmenL, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
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by the corporation should public policy considerations thwart the rec-
ommendation of the special litigation committee.
III. THE PROPOSAL BEFORE THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
In a thoughtful and sweeping review of "what ails the derivative
suit," Professors Coffee and Schwartz propose provocative legislative
reforms for the conduct of derivative suits. These reforms restrict the
availability of special litigation committees and expand the watchdog
role of the courts that review committee recommendations. 30 Coffee
and Schwartz envision the committee as an investigative arm for a
larger deliberative body of independent directors made up of no fewer
than a majority of the corporation's directors. 31 The court would be
130. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 326, 330-36.
131. Id. at 320-26. Coffee and Schwartz envision some change in the board's membership
between the initiation of the suit and the formation of a special litigation committee because their
proposal allows a majority of the independent directors to bar the derivative suit if such a majority
exists when the recommendation is made to the court. Id. at 333 (section 49(e)(1)); see also Dent,
supra note 10, at 122-24.
Coffee and Schwartz expand the size of the independent recommending body beyond its
prevalent three person membership on the theory that independence requires a "critical mass" of
unaffiliated directors to offset the effects of structural bias. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at
323; see also Dent, supra note 10, at 122-23. Although it may be more difficult for the defendants
to locate seven or eight compliant and right-minded nominees than to locate two or three, Coffee
and Schwartz's proposal does not remove the defendants from the selection process. The defend-
ants' involvement at this critical juncture contributes greatly to the special litigation committee's
structural bias; even; under Coffee and Schwartz's formulation, the majority of the committee may
be psychologically committed in advance to the defendants' position. See id at 124.
The defendants' influence in the selection of the independent body is more removed if candi-
dates to the board are chosen by a nominating committee. Seegenerally Conard, Mace, Blough &
Gibson, Functions of Directors Under the Existing System, 27 Bus. LAW. 32, 35-36, 41-46 (Spec.
Issue 1972) (true director independence can exist only if a corporation has an independent nomi-
nating committee); Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375, 408 (1975). Because a nominating
committee separates the defendants from the body of directors that determines the corporation's
interest in the derivative suit, one commentator has argued that if a nominating committee is used
to select the directors who will review the suit's prospective costs and benefits, the court should
defer if the directors decide that the litigation is not in the corporation's best interest. See Small,
The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1388 n.99
(1979). Similarly, there is less concern over the propriety and accuracy of a recommendation to
dismiss when the Securities Exchange Commission nominates directors for the special litigation
committee. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a 'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d
Cir. 1982).
Use of a nominating committee, however, does not solve the problem of structural bias. Even
though the defendants cannot gerrymander the committee's composition and the committee mem-
bers need not fear retaliation by the defendants should their recommendation favor the plaintiff,
the cultural ties common to all directors may adversely disturb the committee's decision. Further-
more, derivative suits that employ special litigation committees generally involve public corpora-
tions, and available statistics reveal that only a distinct minority (34%) of these firms have
nominating committees. See SEc. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) No. 634, at A-7 (Dec. 23, 1981). More
importantly, although 72% of the board members of publicly traded firms are nonmanagement
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powerless to dismiss a derivative action in response to the committee's
recommendation unless a majority of the larger body of independent
directors also favored dismissal. 132
As the reporter for the ALI's Corporate Governance Project, Pro-
fessor Coffee relaxes this requirement. 133 Under the proposal before
the ALI, the court may consider a recommendation offered by a minor-
ity of the board even though the plaintiff implicates a majority of the
board in the alleged wrongdoing. 134 The proposal borrows heavily
from Zapata by requiring the court to make its own independent deter-
outsiders, see id, derivative suits generally implicate a majority of the directors, both affiliated and
unaffiliated. Thus, even if a corporation has a nominating committee, it may fail to buffer effec-
tively the special litigation committee from the defendants' influence because the defendants are
likely to be members of the nominating committee. Selection of the nominating committee's
membership is open to every criticism aimed at the selection of special litigation committee mem-
bership; therefore, the mere existence of a nominating committee should not suffice to persuade a
court of the legitimacy of the special litigation committee's recommendation. Rather, courts
should weigh its presence as one of a host of factors in the review process.
132. The first premise of Coffee and Schwartz's proposal is that the normative standards im-
posed on derivative suit litigation should offer incentives for public corporations to have a major-
ity of their directors be independent of management. Therefore, courts are encouraged to defer to
independent directors' decisions. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 321; see also Coffee, supra
note 10, at 1229-41. Another commentator, however, who also believes that courts should en-
courage independent boards by taking a noninterventionist approach, makes an exception to this
rule when a special litigation committee decides not to pursue a derivative suit against a fellow
director. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board- Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80
MICH. L. REv. 1, 14 (1981).
If board independence is their goal, Professors Coffee and Schwartz should take heart from
statistics that reveal that only a small percentage of publicly traded corporations do not have
outside boards. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 3.03 comment a at 72-73; see also
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 634, at A-6 (Dec. 23, 1981). There is nothing in Coffee and
Schwartz's proposal, however, to stimulate corporations with management dominated boards to
move toward outside boards. First, their proposal does not require the corporation to have had an
independent board when the wrongdoing occurred or when the derivative suit was initiated. At
any time through the suit's long life a corporation may invoke the deference that Coffee and
Schwartz afford to a special litigation committee by securing resignations and electing independ-
ent directors. Therefore, the proposal's value as an incentive for the creation of independent
boards is reduced by the corporation's ability to wait and see whether it needs an independent
board, with no concomitant loss in access to the special litigation committee. Second, there is no
reason for companies not having outside boards to expect that they will be "trouble plagued" and
more frequently the target of derivative suits, as Coffee and Schwartz suggest. See Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 321. Corporations with management dominated boards are not likely
to perceive this lack of independence as a risk; for example, there is no evidence that companies
that have moved to outside boards have done so to achieve a tactical weapon in the event a
derivative suit arises.
133. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03.
134. Id § 7.03(b)(i). The proposal expressly contemplates that the recommendation will come
from a committee, rather than from the full board. Id § 7.03(c). Therefore, the board must fol-
low the procedures recommended as "good corporate practice" for establishing an investigation
committee where the majority of the board is independent. Id § 7.03(b). The comments to sec-
tion 7.03 do not fully address or explain this requirement but appear to follow the reasoning of
Professors Coffee and Schwartz that a committee is a better fact gatherer (although their own
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mination that the business justification advanced in support of the com-
mittee's recommendation "(A) is not outweighed by the probable
recovery or other relief that the court determines is likely to result from
the litigation, (B) does not frustrate any authoritatively established
public policy, and (C) is advanced in good faith. . . . "35 Even if the
independent directors comprise a majority of the board, they cannot
cause the dismissal of a derivative suit that alleges a self-dealing trans-
action with an individual "having control. . . over the corporation." 3
6
Finally, the independent directors must base their recommendation on
a substantial business justification other than the suit's worth on the
merits. 137
Two broad objectives underlie this proposal. First, it seeks to in-
crease the courts' involvement in the review of the directors' recom-
proposal limits the committee to performing an investigative function for a larger deliberative
body of the board, see Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 323).
135. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(c)(ii). To counter the argument that
dismissal is necessary to avoid burdening the corporation with litigation expenses greater than the
expected recovery, the proposal before the ALI includes in the minimum damages recoverable the
"cost and expenses foreseeably paid or incurred to redress" a breach of loyalty. Id. § 706(c). In
settlement and nonloyalty cases, however, the assignment of such costs and expenses to the de-
fendants is within the court's discretion. Id. There is reason to believe that these provisions will
fail to be a complete solution. Most derivative suits are settled, Jones, An Empirical Examination
OfThe Resolution Of Shareholder Derivative And ClassAction Lawsuits, 60 B. U.L. REV. 542, 544-
47 (1980), and the effect of the proposal on settlements is uncertain. The assignment of costs is
merely a factor to be considered in the court's review of the settlement, and the court may be
persuaded not to impose such costs on the defendant by the questionable merits of the case, by the
defendant's good intentions, or by his apparent rehabilitation.
It is also unclear how to apply the proposal when the corporation's success on the merits is
uncertain. For example, if there is at best only a 40% chance of recovery, it is not clear whether
the committee, in weighing the costs and benefits of continuing the suit, should include in its
calculations the full cost of the litigation (which the corporation must bear if it loses the suit), or
whether it should disregard the litigation costs (which, under the proposal before the ALl, the
defendant will bear if the corporation wins). To reflect the uncertainty of recovery, the committee
might include in its calculations some percentage of the expected costs.
A more basic problem with the proposal to the ALI is that in nonloyalty cases the assignment
of costs may well never occur because the costs would cause recovery to exceed the ceiling im-
posed for fault in cases that do not involve a breach of loyalty. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 21, § 706(e). Even in loyalty cases, there are practical limits to what can be recovered from a
defendant who has limited personal assets; the assignment of costs to such a defendant may be an
empty act. Finally, contrary to the unsupported statement in the commentary, see id at 390, it is
more likely that the corporation will protest the suit's continuation on economic grounds when the
alleged wrongdoing is other than a breach of loyalty by insiders. Allegations that question busi-
ness conduct are an attack on the corporation itself, not just on individual officers or directors, cf.
Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945), a t'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3rd Cir.
1946), and in such cases, the corporation is likely to take a more active role in the litigation, which
will raise the litigation costs.
136. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(c)(iii).
137. Id. § 7.03(b)(iii). The proposal invites the court to evaluate the merits of the suit under
section 7.03 (c)(ii), see supra text accompanying note 135, when it determines whether probability
of recovery outweighs the business justification in support of dismissal.
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mendation that a suit be dismissed.138 Second, by requiring judicial
review of the directors' decision in all cases, the proposal seeks to avoid
the death sentence for the derivative suit that almost automatically oc-
curs when the demand on the board has not been excused. 39 These
two objectives are reasonable responses to the threat of structural bias.
The weakness in the proposal lies not in its objectives, but in the stan-
dards it imposes on the courts' review.
A. The Committee's Opinion of the Suit's Merits.
Under the proposal before the ALI, the committee's recommenda-
tion that the suit be dismissed must be grounded on a substantial busi-
ness justification other than the committee's opinion of the suit's
merits.140 This requirement adopts Vice Chancellor Harnett's opinion
in the lower court decision in Zapata that in "our system of law, courts
and not litigants should decide the merits of litigation."' 4' The Vice
Chancellor, however, was concerned about the directors' lack of legal
acumen, not their structural bias. Committee members are not gener-
ally selected because they bring to their job the lawyer's talent for anal-
ysis of the facts and legal principles. Their contribution to the
committee's mission is their purported independence, fairmindedness,
and responsibility to advance the corporation's interests imposed by
state law. It is the invaluable role of counsel to the special litigation
committee to provide the legal talent necessary to assuage the Vice
Chancellor's concern for the committee's competence. 1
42
The committee's task is not to make a final determination of a
suit's legal merits. The committee's task is to offer an opinion of the
risk-and-return possibilities of a suit and of its commercial impact.
This assessment enables the court to consider the costs and benefits of
138. Id. § 7.03(c)(ii).
139. The proposal to the ALl retains the demand requirement, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 21, § 7.02(b), but envisions that the demand is required "precisely in order to give the
board an opportunity to take over the litigation or pursue internal reforms or sanctions," id. at
315. If a demand is made and rejected, the directors' decision not to proceed is subject to judicial
review under the same standards that are used to review a committee's recommendation that a suit
be dismissed. Id. § 7.03(a)(ii).
140. Id. § 7.03(b)(iii).
141. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980) (quoted with approval in
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 n.18 (Del. 1981)).
142. Professor DeMott questions whether reliance on counsel is inconsistent with application
of the business judgment rule. See DeMott, supra note 57, at 863-65. Case law and statutes,
however, permit directors to rely on professionals and experts. See, e.g., CAL. COPP. CODE § 309
(West 1977)i MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1977). The leading case holding that the business
judgment rule protects the directors' decision not to sue a third party is United States Copper Sec.
Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917). This case does not question the-directors'
competence to render a decision on such a legal matter.
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the suit from the corporation's point of view. Whether the court will be
persuaded by the committee's recommendation depends on the accu-
racy and adequacy of the committee's evaluation. Judicial review of
the committee's recommendation should be as effective to detect struc-
tural bias when the justifications are based on the committee's opinion
of the suit's merits as it is when the committee offers other justifications.
In either case, the court must determine whether the recommendation
is discordant with its estimation of the suit's worth. This type of judi-
cial review is identical to the review that a court undertakes before it
approves a proposed settlement, 143 and the proponents of settlement
are not prohibited from questioning the suit's merits. The Vice Chan-
cellor's concern about the directors' legal skills would be warranted,
therefore, only if the reviewing court were to accept uncritically the
committee's appraisal of the suit's merits. As long as the court under-
takes a searching review of the committee's evaluation, the court re-
mains the final arbiter.
The requirement that the committee be prohibited from basing its
recommendation on its opinion of the suit's merits has a more prag-
matic weakness as well. The committee's evaluation of the suit's merits
is not separable from the business justifications that the proposal per-
mits the committee to consider. There is an important dynamic be-
tween the legal merits of the derivative suit and the other grounds that
are appropriate bases for a committee recommendation, and even the
commentary to the proposal recognizes that the committee cannot com-
pletely separate the business justifications for its recommendation from
its opinion of the suit's merits. 144 Indeed, it would not be reasonable
for a committee to opine that it had a substantial business justification
for recommending dismissal unless it first made some evaluation of the
suit's merits. 145 The proposal simply requires the committee and the
court to engage in the charade of using their inquiry into other justifica-
tions for the committee's recommendation as a surrogate for the com-
mittee's evaluation of the suit's merits and for the court's review of that
evaluation.
143. See supra note 78.
144. See, ag., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03, comment c.
145. The proposal before the ALI does not require a court to reject a committee's report if it
includes an assessment of the suit's merits. What the proposal appears to do is to remind the court
that it is the court's function to review the suit's merits. The proposal appears to suggest that there
are two standards of review: one standard for evaluating the committee's business justifications,
and another more demanding standard for evaluating the committee's opinion of the merits of the
suit. Yet, in each case, the commentary describes the court's review as "de novo." Id § 7.03,
comment c. The proposal would be better if it called for a de novo review of all the grounds in the
committee's report, and if those grounds were to include the committee's opinion of the suit's
merits. This would encourage the committee to present its full thinking in one integrated package.
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B. Affronts to Public Policy.
Following Zapata, the proposal before the ALI also empowers the
reviewing court to ignore the corporation's substantial business justifi-
cations for recommending dismissal if dismissal would frustrate "au-
thoritatively established public policy." 146 This aspect of the proposal
is subject to the criticisms directed at Zapata's second level of analy-
sis.' 47 The illustration in the reporter's commentary demonstrates the
unwieldiness of this type of inquiry. 48 In the illustration, a corpora-
tion's general counsel was able to embezzle substantial sums as a result
of defective internal controls that violated the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act. The reporter concludes that even if substantial business con-
cerns justify dismissing the suit,14 9 dismissal would nonetheless thwart
an "authoritatively established public policy" by allowing the corpora-
tion to perpetuate its inadequate system of accounting controls. This
conclusion overemphasizes the importance of dismissal; clearly, dismis-
sal does not preclude the corporation from taking preventive or correc-
tive steps to discourage the alleged wrongful conduct. Indeed, in many
special litigation committee cases, corporations have voluntarily taken
remedial action in the wake of a committee recommendation that the
suit be dismissed.
50
C. Serf-Dealing by a Control Person.
The broadest limitation in the proposal before the ALI is its prohi-
bition of dismissal at the request of the directors if the suit involves
self-dealing between the corporation and a control person.' 5 ' This pro-
hibition has a certain logical appeal: if a controlling stockholder is im-
plicated in the alleged wrongdoing, it may warrant a presumption that
a majority of the board of directors is not independent. Nevertheless,
there is room for some judicial flexibility in passing on a committee's
independence in such cases. For example, the board may be free of the
defendant's controlling interest because during the period between the
146. Id. § 7.03(c)(ii)(B).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 94-127.
148. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03, illustration No. 1.
149. Id The reporter mentions the general counsel's years of good service and the effect of the
suit on employee morale as reasons for recommending dismissal although he correctly notes that
these justifications would virtually never be appropriate in an embezzlement case.
150. See Payson, Dismissal of Derivative Actions: The Debate, 6 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 522, 527
(1981).
151. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(c)(iii). Courts may dismiss suits that
implicate a controlling stockholder in conduct that does not involve self-dealing by him or by
others if the committee's recommendation satisfies the other requirements of section 7.03, see
supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
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initiation of the derivative suit and the formation of the committee the
defendant sold control to another. Or the committee may be appointed
under the supervision and advice of an outside regulatory body.'5 2
Therefore, in at least these two instances, the committee may not be
affected by the defendant's influence, and courts should be free to con-
sider the particular circumstances of the committee's composition and
selection, and the degree of the defendant's dominance, to ascertain
whether the committee is actually independent. The proposal as cur-
rently drafted prevents such a flexible response.153
152. Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aj'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.
1982), presents this type of fact situation. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
153. The proposal contains a rather narrowly drafted technical section that permits the corpo-
ration to petition the court to appoint a special panel to study the derivative suit and make a
recommendation to the court. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(f). Although this
provision appears to provide special procedures for cases in which a controlling stockholder is
accused of self-dealing through the corporation, its scope is in fact much narrower. The court may
appoint a panel only when the corporation is incapable of appointing a committee under the
standards of independence embodied in section 7.03(e). Section 7.03(e) defines the term in-
dependent director as follows:
Independent Director: As used in this Section and § 7.05, the term "independent direc-
tor" shall mean a director who (i) is able under the circumstances to exercise impartial,
disinterested, and critical judgment with respect to the defendants in the action, (ii) if the
action is against any present or former senior executive [§ 1.23] or person possessing
control [§ 1.041 over the corporation, has no significant relationship [§ 1.24] with any
senior executive of the corporation or any controlling person, (iii) was not elected to the
board subsequent to the earlier of the commencement of the action or the making de-
mand by plaintiff therein, unless such election was by a vote of the shareholders at an
annual meeting on nomination by a committee of two or more independent directors or,
if to fill a vacancy on the board, by the vote of a committee of two or more independent
directors, in either case without the active participation of any defendants in the action,
and (iv) is not a defendant in the action; provided, however, that the naming of a director
as a defendant in the action shall not alone disqualify the director from serving as a
member of the committee, or otherwise participating in the appointment or election of a
new director to serve on such a committee, if the court finds that the inclusion of the
director as a defendant was without merit. In determining both whether a director is
able under the circumstances to exercise impartial, disinterested, and critical judgment
and the credence to be accorded any justifications offered for dismissal by a committee of
such directors, the court (A) may consider whether the director was elected or appointed
to the board by an independent nominating committee that complies with the standards
specified in § 3.06, and (B) shall give substantial weight to (i) whether under the circum-
stances demand on the board would have been required or excused as futile under tradi-
tional principles because of the substantial involvement of directors in the action as
defendants, and (ii) whether any investigation or other action commenced by the board,
or a committee thereof, prior to the earlier of the making of demand or the filing of the
action demonstrates the exercise of critical scrutiny by the board or committee of the
defendant's conduct.
Id. § 7.03(e).
If the defendant is no longer the corporation's controlling stockholder, the directors could
satisfy the independence criteria of section 703(e). Therefore the court could not appoint a special
panel; yet, under section 703(f), the corporation could not avail itself of the special litigation com-
mittee. This may be the result of a drafting oversight; presumably, the drafters intended to require
that courts, not the corporation, appoint the panel in cases involving self-dealing by a controlling
stockholder. However, it is not clear why this limited area of corporate fiduciary litigation ought
to be singled out for special treatment.
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1. Mis.placed Reliance on Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial
Corp. With respect to suits against a controlling stockholder in which
there is no allegation of self-dealing, the proposal before the ALI offers
a more demanding standard for judging committee independence than
that currently invoked by the courts. 154 The reporter's commentary
does not clearly explain why this higher standard is not sufficient when
there are allegations of self-dealing by a control person. The first of two
arguments155 that the reporter advances in support of the special treat-
ment of self-dealing cases relies on Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Finan-
cial Corp.,'56 but this case appears to support the wisdom of the
proposal's definition of independence far better than it supports an ab-
solute ban on the use of a special litigation committee when there are
allegations of self-dealing by a control person.
In Clark, NCS Computer Corporation (NCS) merged with Booth,
Inc. The stockholders of the new corporation initiated a derivative suit
against Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. (LNFC), the former con-
trolling stockholder of NCS. For three years, the directors of Booth,
Inc., took no part in the litigation despite two demands made on them
under rule 23.1. The complaint was then amended to add as defend-
ants certain officers of Booth, Inc. and Jack Booth, the controlling
stockholder; the new defendants allegedly aided and abetted LNFC
in dismantling NCS's successful computer operations. By adding Jack
Booth as a defendant the plaintiff awakened a sleeping giant. Booth,
Inc. joined the defendants in a motion to dismiss the actions and later
entered into a settlement with all of the defendants. 57 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in what it referred to as a "parity of rea-
soning"' 5 8 to cases excusing the demand requirement, vacated the dis-
trict court's approval of the settlement. 59 The appellate court reasoned
Section 703(f) is also inconsistent with other parts of the proposal because a recommendation
of dismissal from a court-appointed panel may not be ignored on the grounds that dismissal
would contravene established public policy. Id § 7.03(f). The commentary does not explain why
the need for deterrence is persuasive when a special litigation committee offers a recommendation,
see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text, but not when a panel chosen by the court issues
the recommendation.
154. CORPORATE GOVER4ANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(e).
155. Id. § 7.03, comment d, at 327-28.
156. 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
157. Id. at 50-51. The Fifth Circuit opinion suggests that the plaintiffs were foreclosed from
these settlement negotiations.' Id at 51. The trial transcript, however, shows that the district court
judge provided the impetus for the settlement negotiations, and that the plaintiff participated in
the negotiations. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D. Tex.
1978). The plaintiff was not a party to the final proposal only because the defendants were unwill-
ing to settle the plaintifi's individual claim along with the derivative suit. See id




that the directors of Booth, Inc. were incompetent to approve a settle-
ment because they were under the Control of defendants Jack Booth
and LNFC. The uncontroverted evidence showed that Jack Booth and
LNFC elected all the directors to the board of Booth, Inc. and that a
majority of the directors were corporate officers or employees.160
The significance of Clark should not be misinterpreted. Although
Jack Booth was a controlling stockholder of Booth, Inc., when the set-
tlement was proposed, he was not a controlling stockholder of NCS
when the alleged harms occurred; Mr. Booth was implicated as the al-
leged aider and abettor of someone else who was in control. Because
the complaint focused on the transfer of NCS's computer business to
LNFC and not to Booth, Inc., Jack Booth was not engaged in self-
dealing. It is inappropriate to cite Clark as evidence of a court's un-
willingness to defer to directors' recommendations in suits that allege
self-dealing by a controlling stockholder; Clark questions director im-
partiality in any suit against a current control person.
The procedures in the proposal before the ALI for determining
director independence, 61 and particularly for the appointment of new
directors to serve on a special litigation committee, 62 offer a workable
response to the problem presented in Clark. The directors in Clark
were appointed after the derivative suit was initiated. Unless they were
elected by a vote of the stockholders at an annual meeting after nomi-
nation by a committee of independent directors, or chosen by in-
dependent directors to fill a board vacancy, these directors would be
ineligible for special litigation committee membership under the propo-
sal. In either case, defendants Jack Booth and LNFC would have had
no active role in their nominatioil or election. 163 The criteria for direc-
tor independence under the proposal suffice to solve the problem posed
by the facts in Clark, and Clark offers no support for the theory that
self-dealing transactions are a special subspecies of controlling stock-
holder misconduct that is beyond the reach of a committee of in-
dependent directors. Nor does Clark question a committee's
competence to settle a derivative suit.164 Therefore, the reporter's reli-
ance on Clark to justify special treatment for cases involving self-deal-
ing by controlling stockholders is misplaced.
160. Id at 52-54.
161. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(e).
162. Id § 7.03(b).
163. Id. § 7.03(e).
164. The Clark court recognized that an independent committee may have been able to
"achieve what the directors unsuccessfully attempted." 625 F.2d at 54 n.6.
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2. Misinterpretation of State Conflict ofInterest Statutes. The re-
porter's second argument in support of the proposal's special treatment
of self-dealing by control persons is that it would be inconsistent with
state conflict of interest statutes to dismiss an action involving self-deal-
ing on the basis of a committee recommendation. 165 Some commenta-
tors have argued that under state conflict of interest statutes, only a
court may approve a self-dealing transaction after the transaction has
taken place.166 Only a court is sufficiently insulated to judge the fair-
ness of the transaction. The rationale behind this limitation is that be-
cause the directors will be less willing to rescind a self-dealing
transaction once it has been consummated, 167 they are not permitted to
approve self-dealing transactions retrospectively. To allow a special
litigation committee to protect a self-dealing transaction from attack in
a derivative suit would be equivalent to permitting them to approve the
transaction in retrospect, and this would circumvent the supposed pur-
pose of the conflict of interest statutes. 168
Most state conflict of interest statutes clearly allow disinterested
directors to approve retrospectively transactions between an officer or
director and his corporation.1 69 A distinct minority of the statutes,
165. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE supra note 21, § 7.03, comment d, at 327-28.
166. Professor Buxbaum was the first to make this argument. See Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Inter-
ests Statutes andthe Needfor a Demand on Directors in DerivativeActions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122
(1980).
167. Id at 1127.
168. Accepting this interpretation of the state conffict of interest statutes would not compel the
line-drawing embodied in the proposal before the ALL. The proposal addresses self-dealing by
controlling stockholders, see supra note 151 and accompanying text, but state conffict of interest
statutes are concerned with dealings between the corporation and its directors or officers, or be-
tween the corporation and another corporation in which a director or officer has an interest. See,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 144(a) (1975); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(a) (McKinney Supp. 1971); MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 41 (1977). The
statutes do not proscribe transactions between a corporation and its controlling stockholder if the
controlling stockholder is not also a director of the corporation. Acceptance of Professor Bux-
baum's thesis, therefore, should require special provisions in the proposal before the ALI for cases
that involve self-dealing by directors or officers, not self-dealing by controlling stockholders (ex-
cept where the control person is also a director or officer).
169. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-63 (1) (1980); A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-04(a)(1)(1977); CAL.
CoRu'. CODE § 310(a)(2)(West. 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.124(l)(a) (West 197t); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-41(a) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 271A.205(l)(a) (Baldwin 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § (l)(a) (1981); MD. CORPS &
AsS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-419(b)(1)(i) (Michie Supp. 1981); MICH. Bus. CoRP. ACT § 545(b); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-413 (l)(a) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2040.01(1) (1977); NEv. Rnv. STAT.
§ 78.140(l)(a) (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41(l)(a) (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:6-8(l)(b) (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 713(a)(1) (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30(b)(1)(1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.265(l)(a) (1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160(a)(1) (Law. Co-Op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-816(l)(a) (1979);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1888 (1973); VA. STOCK CORP. ACT 13.1-39.1(i); W. VA. CoRP. ACT 31-
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however, provide only that the board of directors may "authorize the
contract or transaction."1 70 This language suggests that even independ-
ent directors cannot retrospectively approve a self-dealing transaction
and that retrospective approval could therefore only occur after a judi-
cially superintended inquiry into the transaction's fairness. The legisla-
tive history of the statutes, however, rejects this interpretation.
Conflict of interest statutes were enacted to reverse restrictive and
ambigubus case authority that might be used to void transactions
solely on the basis of a director's or officer's interest in the transac-
tion. 17' Through the statutes, legislatures sought to extend presumptive
validity to these self-dealing contracts and to articulate procedures by
which the parties to the transaction could obtain director or stock-
holder approval. These objectives are clearly expressed in the statutes'
introductory clauses, which state that if the parties comply with the
statutory procedures, the "transaction or contract will not be void or
voidable solely because of the officer's or director's interest.' 7 2
The conflict of interest statutes do not address the abuses that arise
in connection with unfair self-dealing contracts entailing a director's or
officer's breach of a fiduciary obligation. Even though a transaction
may technically satisfy the statutory requirements, any underlying
fiduciary breach remains subject to redress outside the statute.173
1-25(a)(1) (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.355(1) (West Supp. 1981-1982); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-
136.1(a)(i) (Supp. 1982).
170. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323(a) (West 1960 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN, tit.
8, § 144(a)(1) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-716(a)(1) (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6340(a)(1)
(1981), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:84(A)(1) (West 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60(a)(1)
(Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.175(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980-1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1409.(A)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 701.1-37.1(a)(1) (1969 & Supp. 1981).
171. California enacted the first conflict of interest statute in 1931 to liberalize case law that
invalidated transactions between a corporation and its directors solely because a director had an
interest in the transaction. See Ballantine, Questions ofPolicy in Drafting Modern Corporation
Law, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 475-76 (1931). Other states enacted similar provisions to provide
greater flexibility and certainty in self-dealing transactions. See generaly Bulbulia & Pinto, Statu-
tory Responses to InterestedDirectors' Transactions: 4 Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53
NOTRE DAME LAW. 201 (1977); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 46-48 (1966); Note, The Status of the Fairness Test Under Section 713 of
the New York Business Corporation Law, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1156, 1166-74 (1976); Note, Corpora-
tions: Interlocking Directorates: Statutory Regulation of Dealings Between Corporations with Inter-
locking Directorates, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 445 (1938).
172. See .upra notes 169 & 170 (statutes cited).
173. In only one case has a court held that a self-dealing transaction which satisfied the state
conflict of interest statute implicated the directors in a breach of their fiduciary duty. See Remil-
lard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). Despite the
court's holding, it is not clear that the transaction in RemillardBrick did in fact meet the statutory
requirements. The California provision required that stockholder approval of a self-dealing trans-
action be in "good faith," but the defendants in RemillardBrick obtained stockholder approval of
the transaction only because they held proxies to vote a majority of the shares.
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Therefore, the policy behind state conflict of interest statutes does not
justify the imposition of stricter standards of review in self-dealing
cases.
Furthermore, if the directors in a self-dealing case reject a demand
for suit or if a committee recommends dismissal, this retrospective ap-
proval of a self-dealing transaction does not carry the same presump-
tive weight as director approval in accordance with a conflict of interest
statute. In an attack on a self-dealing transaction that has been author-
ized by independent directors in accordance with a state conflict of in-
terest statute, the transaction is presumed valid, and the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving otherwise. 174 By contrast, if a committee recom-
mends that a derivative suit be dismissed, the directors bear the burden
of proof. Therefore, the policies behind a state conflict of interest stat-
ute are not threatened even if the transaction did not satisfy the statute,
and the directors are permitted to authorize dismissal of the suit. In
such cases, the transaction enjoys no presumption of validity.
3. Undue Deference to the Pleadings. Professors Coffee and
Schwartz have also argued that when the derivative suit alleges self-
dealing by a controlling stockholder, the court must disregard the spe-
cial litigation committee's recommendation that the suit be dis-
missed. 175 Coffee and Schwartz argue that the scope of Burks v.
Lasker176 should be limited so that the special litigation committee can
not prevent the derivative suit from performing its historical function
of enforcing the duty of loyalty. 177 This is a most puzzling justification.
If the special litigation committee is a properly functioning instru-
ment, satisfying the many requirements laid down for it by Professors
Other courts that have reviewed the fairness of a self-dealing transaction that satisfies the
state conflict of interest statute have upheld the transaction. See Scott v. Multi-Amp. Corp., 386
F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974); Hadden v. Krevit, 186 Conn. 587, 442 A.2d 944 (1982); Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Aronoffv. Albanese, 85 A.D.2d 3, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1982).
In each of these cases, stockholders, not disinterested directors, had approved the transaction.
There is no direct authority to support a court's independent review of a transaction's fairness
when there has been good faith approval by disinterested directors after full disclosure. At least
one state statute, however, expressly authorizes such a review. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(2)
II (West 1977).
174. See, e.g., E. FOLK III, THE DELAWARE GEN. CORP. LAW, A COMMENTARY AND ANALY-
Ss 82-86 (1972); Israels, The Corporate Triangle-Some Comparative Aspects ofthe New Jersey,
New York and Delaware Statutes, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 627-28 (1969); cf WM. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERtALS 585-86 (5th Ed. 1980).
175. Section 7.03(c)(iii) of the proposal before the ALI and Coffee and Schwartz's proposed
modification of section 49(0(5) of the Model Business Corporation Act are substantively identical.
See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 334.
176. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
177. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 322.
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Coffee and Schwartz, 178 there should be no residual desire to limit the
scope of the committee's action. Under the standards advanced by
Professors Coffee and Schwartz, the committee must always have a
substantial business justification for its good faith recommendation, the
court must concur with the committee's reasoning, and the recommen-
dation must not conflict with any authoritatively established public pol-
icy. Once these requirements are satisfied, it is hardly reasonable to
suppose that dismissal of the derivative suit will prevent the redressing
of a corporate injury. On the other hand, if the requirements are insuf-
ficient to prevent dismissal of cases that are in the corporation's best
interest, why single out the subset of loyalty cases for full judicial
review?
Coffee and Schwartz's argument seems to presuppose some pre-
judgment of a case based on the content of the pleadings. Their rea-
soning is similar to that in the commentary to the proposal before the
ALI, which posits a spectrum of corporate wrongdoing and classifies
cases by the type of wrongdoing involved. Cases in which plaintiffs
have historically enjoyed little chance of recovery, such as challenges to
business decisions, occupy one end of the spectrum; cases in which the
plaintiffs have had greater success, such as self-dealing cases, occupy
the other. 179 Determinations of the requisite level of judicial deference
to committee recommendations are then resolved by the location of the
complaint in the spectrum of cases;180 suits that allege self-dealing by a
controlling stockholder lie at the far end of the spectrum where no def-
erence is due. Under this analysis, Jack Booth as aider and abettor of
another defendant could be shielded from liability by a committee's
recommendation of dismissal, but complaints against him as a misap-
propriator of assets could not be similarly deflected. The reason for
regarding the committee more cynically in the one instance than in the
other lies solely in the nature of the charges leveled by the complaint.
The merit of this type of analysis is not intuitively obvious.
A well-reasoned opinion by Judge Seitz in Lewis v. Curtis'8 l re-
cently denied that important procedural determinations may turn on
the nature of the complaint. Judge Seitz offered guidelines for formu-
lating standards by which to determine whether a demand on the board
should be excused. The standards apply equally to the question of the
appropriate degree of deference due a committee's recommendation.
178. See id at 333-34.
179. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03 comment a, at 304, 307 and comment c
at 321.
180. See, e.g., Id §§ 7.03, 7.06(c) & (d).
181. 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982).
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Under Judge Seitz's guidelines, the ultimate concern is whether the
facts alleged warrant a court's refusal to defer to the board's (or the
committee's) decision not to pursue the claim.18 2 In Lewis, the defend-
ants sought a ruling that would have accorded directors greater free-
dom to cause a suit's dismissal if the plaintiff failed to plead director
conduct that was facially improper. Judge Seitz concluded that to
make the directors' power contingent on the nature of the complaint
would impermissibly create a pleadings defense to the factual
dispute.1
8 3
Similarly, the availability to the corporation of a special litigation
committee, and the impact of its recommendation, should depend not
on the plaintifi's allegations, but on the court's factual determination
that the committee can regard the defendants impartially. The stan-
dard offered to the ALI for testing the committee members' indepen-
dence, its extension of the court's review to all derivative suits against
fiduciaries, and its allocation of the burden of proof to the corporation
offer a sound framework within which this determination can be made.
The failings of the proposal before the ALI are the substantive limita-
tions it imposes'on this framework based on the nature of the plaintiff's
pleadings. The goal of the proposal should be to establish procedures
and standards by which the court can decide whether the directors
speak for the corporate interest. Instead, Professor Coffee appears in-
tent on assuring prosecution of actions that fall within certain poorly
conceived categories, regardless of the action's harm or benefit to the
corporation.
IV. WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CORPORATION: A PROPOSED CURE FOR
STRUCTURAL BIAS
The demand requirement and the special litigation committee are
devices that enable the corporation to express its interest in the continu-
ation or dismissal of the derivative suit. Whether the directors' voice
should be viewed as the legitimate voice of the corporation depends on
the court's belief that the directors are sufficiently detached from the.
defendants and the underlying cause of action to render a bona fid&'
recommendation. Detailed requirements, such as those proposed to the
ALl, 18 4 can define director independence so as to eliminate from the
decisionmaking group directors who have significant family or business
relationships with the defendant, who have been substantively impli-
182. Id at 785, 786.
183. Id at 786.
184. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, § 7.03(e) (discussed supra note 35).
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cated in the alleged misconduct, or who may have been selected for
board membership by the defendants after the suit began. Such limita-
tions, however, reach only the most obvious causes of director bias.
The more subtle malady of structural bias cannot be treated solely by
noting suspect relationships and the manner of the directors' appoint-
ment. Whether the directors' impartiality should be questioned further
depends on whether structural bias is perceived as real or imagined,
and whether, if it exists, it does in fact distort directors' evaluations of
the derivative suit. The proposal that follows assumes that structural
bias is inherent to the directors' decisionmaking and can, but ad-
mittedly does not always, have a significant impact on their
recommendation.
The overriding concern in evaluating a committee's recommenda-
tion is to determine the corporation's true interest in the derivative suit.
Both Zapata and the proposal before the ALI suggest that the corpora-
tion's interest in dismissal may be subordinated to an authoritatively
established public policy, but this suggestion thwarts the derivative
suit's historical mission of redressing corporate injuries and forces
courts to make questionable public policy determinations. Concern for
the corporate interest must be the foundation for any pretrial scrutiny
of the probable benefits of the suit's continued prosecution. Otherwise,
the courts could freely ignore the directors' recommendations and al-
low the litigation to pursue an uninterrupted course.
The most effective remedy for structural bias is to require the
courts to take a more active role in their review of the directors' recom-
mendation than Zapata advocates.'85 Instead of simply ascertaining
that there is a reasonable basis for the directors' recommendation, a
court should use its own independent judgment to determine whether
dismissal would be in the corporation's best interest.186 The court
should make its decision after an adversarial proceeding that is care-
fully tailored to avoid consuming the corporation's resources through
too lengthy an investigation. The purpose of these hearings would be
to assure a close review of the directors' findings and conclusions. The
burden of proof should be on the directors, not only because there may
be doubt as to their unwavering devotion to the corporation's interests,
but also because they have unlimited access to information that bears
on the commercial interests allegedly served through dismissal. Of
course, the directors should be required to meet at least a threshold
185. This assumes, of course, that Zapata only requires the court to examine the facts support-
ing the committee's decision not to conduct its own inquiry into the merits of the suit. See supra
notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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standard of independence, such as that in the proposal before the ALl,
so that they are not overly involved with the defendants or with the
underlying cause of action. This level of independence is not suffi-
ciently persuasive, however, to relieve the directors of the burden of
proof or to prevent the court from exercising its independent judgment.
Nevertheless, the directors' independence is not insignificant; if the
threshold standard is met, the court need not hesitate to carefully pro-
scribe the areas for preliminary discovery on the suit's merits as well as
the length and boundaries of any preliminary hearing. The court
should also consider the directors' independence in weighing the
soundness of the committee's reasoning.
In their review of the committee's recommendation, courts should
not be constrained by the character of the alleged misconduct or by the
defendant's status. The threat of structural bias is no greater in deriva-
tive suits that allege self-dealing or in suits against the controlling
stockholder than in other types of derivative suit litigation. Further-
more, conflict of interest statutes need not bar the directors' decision
that a derivative suit that alleges self-dealing should be dismissed.
It is arguable that this approach should also apply when a court
reviews a board's rejection of a demand for suit. The considerations
that support judicial deference to a commercial decision of the board
are not present when the directors' decision pertains to the continuation
of a derivative suit. It is inconsistent to subject the special litigation
committee's recommendation to higher scrutiny than is given to a deci-
sion of the full board of directors. Although Zapata is distinctive for its
sensitivity to director bias,187 it adopts the conventional view that the
board's decision to reject a demand should be protected by the business
judgment rule.' 8 Zapata thus requires a higher level of scrutiny in
cases in which the demand is excused and in which a special litigation
committee recommends dismissal, but permits a lower level of review
when a demand is required and rejected.' 8 9
The court in Zapata may have assumed that the directors can be
expected to rise collectively above the pressures of structural bias when
a demand is required because the majority is not affiliated with the
cause of action.'90 This mistaken assumption gives rise to several
187. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
188. Id at 787 n.10.
189. Id at 787.
190. See Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Even though a majority of the
directors were independent, the Stein court placed on the committee the burden of proving its
independence because the committee was a minority of the board. Id at 692. The protection of
the business judgment rule may therefore be unwarranted if the majority relies on a report pre-
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equally mistaken conclusions. First, it follows that the committee's rec-
ommendation should escape Zapata's higher standard of review and be
within the protections of the business judgment rule if the committee
included not less than a majority of the full board;191 the committee
would then have the critical mass necessary to protect its members
from retaliation. Second, if the suit were against the company's con-
trolling stockholders, the threat of retaliation would require the court to
ignore the committee's recommendation even if a majority of the direc-
tors were on the committee.'
92
The requirement that the committee have a critical mass of in-
dependent members to overcome the threat of retaliation arises from
too narrow a perspective on the forces that underlie director bias. To
be sure, directors can be expected to be less independent if they fear
that a decision adverse to their colleagues' interests will cost them the
perquisites of a corporate directorship. The threat of retaliation, how-
ever, is by no means the sole source of the directors' structural bias.
Structural bias is an attitude that attaches to a directorship and rests on
cultural ties that antedate the director's election or appointment, which
combine to draw the directors to the defendants' side. Therefore, un-
less it is assumed that director bias arises solely out of a fear of retalia-
tion,193 there is little reason to vary the degree of judicial review of the
directors' recommendation simply because the independent directors
are a majority or a minority of the board.
pared by a committee composed of a minority of the board. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d
1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
191. Some would argue, however, that a court should not consider the recommendation of
even an expanded committee unless a majority of all the directors are independent. See Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 320-26.
192. Cf Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980). Similarly, some
courts have excused a demand on the board because the defendants had the undisputed power to
elect directors to office. For example, in de Hass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809
(D.D.C. 1968), afl'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), two of the five directors were clearly under
the defendant's control. The remaining directors stated in depositions that they were not under
the defendant's control and that they would take whatever action was in the corporation's best
interest. The court nevertheless excused the demand on the basis of the defendant's control of the
board, even though the directors had voted contrary to the defendant's wishes on previous occa-
sions. Id at 814. The result is criticized in Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in
Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 108, 124 (1976). The more prevalent view is
contrary to the holding in de Hass. The demand requirement is usually not excused even if the
defendant owns a controlling block of stock unless there are also specific allegations that the
defendant actually exercises control over the directors' decisions. See, e.g., Greenspun v. Del E.
Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Kaufman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276,
284 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Stepak
v. Dean, 434 A.2d 388, 390-91 (Del. Ch. 1981); Greenspun v. Lindley, 44 A.D.2d 20, 352 N.Y.S.2d
633, 638 (1974), afl'd, 36 N.Y.2d 473, 369 N.Y.S.2d 123, 330 N.E.2d 79 (1975).
193. See, ag., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-87 (Del. 1980).
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The special litigation committee poses no mortal threat to the con-
tinued existence of derivative suit litigation. To the contrary, the ad-
vent of the special litigation committee may serve a constructive
function by stimulating serious reconsideration of the court's pretrial
role in evaluating the corporation's interest in a derivative suit's dismis-
sal. The recent origin of the special litigation committee offers the
courts an opportunity to examine the corporate interest served by a
suit's dismissal unburdened by precedent and unconfined by statute.
The questionable aspects of Zapata and the proposal before the ALI do
not erode their significance in calling attention to the serious conse-
quences of giving any body of directors the power to speak for the cor-
poration's interest in a derivative suit against their colleagues. Now
that the problem has been openly recognized, courts should be en-
couraged to take a less passive role, not only when they respond to a
special litigation committee's recommendation, but whenever they
review the directors' involvement in the proposed dismissal of a deriva-
tive suit. Structural bias may be easier to discern in the recommenda-
tion of a special litigation committee, but it is equally present, and
equally problematic, when the directors refuse a demand for suit or
approve an out-of-court settlement. When the directors opine that a
derivative suit must be dismissed, only the court can have sufficient
detachment to evaluate legitimately whether the corporate interest
would be better served by its continuation.
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